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THESIS

TIME FOR A CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES - JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP?

by

Russell P. Ashford

December, 1996

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Claude A. Buss
Edward A. Olsen

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**TIME FOR A CHANGE IN THE U.S. - JAPAN
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP ?**

Russell P. Ashford
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., Rhodes College, 1983

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

The United States - Japan Security relationship continues to exist in its present form because both sides have become used to it, and are wary to let it die in the face of future uncertainties. Without a threat of the proportions the Soviet Union once posed, Japanese and American officials are unable to find a solid strategic foundation upon which to justify the current level of military integration.

Yet, the "Japan - United States Joint Declaration on Security" made by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto in April 1996 talks about reaffirming and deepening these ties based on the need to maintain regional stability. At the same time neither side is willing to outline what changes in the current security environment are required to obviate the need for such a relationship.

The problems with deepening the level of security cooperation between the United States and Japan are manifest. Even when a clear, common threat served as the basis for their coordinated efforts during the Cold War, the Japanese did not view their security relationship with the United States as a full fledged alliance. During that period, Japanese policy makers were careful to avoid any increased military commitment, or foreign policy alignment with the United States that was not absolutely essential to the maintenance of the relationship.

Now, both countries require more flexibility in dealing with other Asian countries than their current bilateral relationship allows. In a multipolar world, both Japan and the United States must individually decide how to defend their interests as they are challenged.

This thesis examines both the origins and current status of the United States - Japan security relationship. It also appraises the relationships and conflicts of interests that both nations have with other powers in the Asian arena.

The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to provide some insight into the making of the current and future policies of both Japan and the United States.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

If the architects of the first United States - Japan Security Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and John Foster Dulles, were still alive, they would be surprised and disappointed to find that the security relationship has survived largely unchanged, and has outlived the international political environment that led to its inception.

Both governments continue to emphasize the demands of the current security environment in Asia as a rationale for maintaining the relationship in its present form. While the United States and Japan certainly might find enough common ground to renegotiate and sign a security treaty for 1996, neither side would agree to the basing of over 45,000 United States troops in Japan given current threat levels. The American public would demand to know the “exit strategy” - How long would the basing of troops last? What conditions in Asia would allow for their withdrawal?

A newly created security relationship would undoubtedly be a more balanced agreement that would give Japan more responsibility for its own defense, and the maintenance of regional security. United States presence would be limited to a few key naval bases and air bases. The only United States ground forces in Japan would be, at most, a very much smaller contingent of marines.

Both countries require more flexibility in dealing with other Asian countries than their current bilateral relationship allows. Japan and the United States have different agendas and methodologies in their dealings with Asia's main emerging power - China. Japan has preferred to opt for cooperation and quiet diplomacy in its relationship with its large neighbor. The United States and Japan also have differing policy priorities in their relations with other Pacific Rim nations.

President Clinton's visit to Japan in April 1996 did nothing to fundamentally alter the American-led security framework for Asia built during the height of the Cold War. Instead the resulting "Joint Declaration on Security" called for deepening the United States-Japan security relationship.

The problems with deepening the level of security cooperation between the United States and Japan are manifest. Even when a clear, common threat served as the basis for their coordinated efforts during the Cold War, the Japanese did not view their security relationship with the United States as a full fledged alliance. During that period, Japanese policy makers were careful to avoid any increased military commitment, or foreign policy alignment with the United States that was not absolutely essential to the maintenance of the relationship. Therefore, it was not until the early 1980s that any substantial combined United States - Japan military exercises were conducted.

It is in American interests to reach a new agreement with Japan of the appropriate relative roles of the two countries in dealing with regional and global concerns. Trying to keep Japan in a geopolitically subordinate position by containing it via the existing U.S.-Japan bilateral alliance will become a more questionable procedure as time goes by, and as Japan's relative power grows. Before such a policy collapses under its own weight, it is more prudent for the United States to seek a revised security relationship with Japan that is based on a more realistic appraisal of their relationship in the new international security environment of the region.

If Japan decides that it prefers to use "check-book diplomacy" rather than dispatching its troops in a given situation, then it should be left to do so. Conversely, United States policy makers must remember that they have a duty to choose their fights carefully. Being tied to commitments that do not clearly affect vital interests is a luxury that America cannot afford. They also should remember that moral crusades to remake other countries into America's

image do not excuse the immorality of wasting America's sons and daughters, and wealth on fruitless errands.

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To my father who never thought it was silly to talk to a six year old boy about world affairs.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE CHANGING NATURE OF SECURITY

Since the end of the Cold War, many American political leaders and security analysts have conducted zero-based reviews of the country's national security requirements, and the policies that have been recommended to achieve those new goals. While there have been disagreements over the implications of trends that are reshaping the international political environment, most agree that the primacy of military power has waned, and the relative importance of national economic vitality has gained new emphasis among the world's great powers. Furthermore, transnational problems like pollution, immigration, and terrorism have challenged the capacity of individual nation-states to protect their own interests without the help of the international organizations, and international cooperation.

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, nation-states have been responsible to their citizenry for providing military security. During the Cold War, both communist and democratic governments discharged this responsibility to an unprecedented degree. The magnitude of national treasure allocated to military efforts by democratic nations not involved in a hot war was without parallel. As the Soviets and Americans were engaged in what they perceived to be a zero-sum struggle, the threat of a nuclear war that promised to destroy all of human civilization hung over the nations of the earth. At times, regional military conflicts seemed like they were pushing the two superpowers to just such a precipice. The gravity of the possibilities brought on by this bipolar struggle forced the two superpowers, in particular, and their allies (to a lesser but still profound degree) to subordinate other national objectives like

improving infrastructure, and promoting a more prosperous civil society. Relative inattention to socioeconomic security needs has left the states of the former U.S.S.R. and the United States facing many of the same types of ills --- if on a different scale. Both are plagued by high crime rates, drug and alcohol abuse, serious government debt, and deteriorating infrastructure.

Another characteristic of the by-gone Cold War was the stridency and importance given to the ideologies driving the two camps. The successful strategy of containment was based on its own set of beliefs that contained dogmatic elements. While it served to unify allied efforts to confront the threat of Soviet expansionism, the belief in containment strategy sometimes made American leaders purblind to other, more promising policy options. America's failure in Vietnam caused its people to question not only the dogma that inspired their side during the struggle of the Cold War, it also caused a more fundamental reexamination of American values. From an international political perspective, the most important outcome of the Vietnam War was its impact on American willingness to become involved in armed conflict. Some 20 years after the fall of Saigon, American presidents still have to demonstrate to the American people that they are not about to become involved in military adventures that resemble Vietnam "quagmires." American reluctance to send troops to Bosnia is a current example of this lingering unease caused by their failure in Vietnam.

The death of communism as an ideology and strategy designed to further the socioeconomic development of mankind is complete. Communist China and North Korea only cling to the superstructure of the communist state in order to preserve domestic political

stability. Those people who devoted their careers to the defense and promotion of communism's discredited creed also possess a melancholy disenchantment with ideological imperatives. Instead, citizens of the former Soviet Union focus on improving their day-to-day existence, and mainland Chinese are caught up in the frenetic drive to take part in an historic economic boom.

In short, ideological extremes are passe in most parts of the world (even radical Islamic movements in the Middle East have been sobered by the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the failures of the Iranian Revolution). However, as has been clearly demonstrated in the former Yugoslavia, Russia, and parts of Africa, nationalism and ethnic conflict have reemerged after years of being sidelined by coercive power. In Northeast Asia, nationalism has found its expression in the more nuanced, and mature requests of Japan to be given a seat on the Security Council, Chinese demands that foreigners stop meddling in their internal affairs, and Korean efforts to erase the architectural reminders of their colonial past.

Another phenomenon that has fundamentally changed the calculations of national security requirements in the new international system has been the spectacular rise of the so-called newly industrialized economies (NIEs) --- particularly the "Asian Tigers" who were inspired by the Japanese model of economic growth. Ironically the very success of the NIEs was made possible by the Bretton Woods system, and the promotion of free trade by the United States as part of a strategy to bolster its allies in the struggle against communism.

From 1965 to 1990, eight high-performing Asian economies --- Hong Kong, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand ---

experienced remarkable economic growth, and substantially improved living standards. High rates of investment exceeding 20 percent of GDP on average between 1960 and 1990, including in particular unusually high rates of private investment, combined with rising endowments of human capital due to universal primary and secondary education, are factors that explain a large part of their rapid growth. [Ref. 1] Their state-supported export push strategy, coupled with government intervention designed to target certain industries, encourage applied research, and public savings are also cited as the causes of the economic miracle. [Ref. 2] Whether the success of sound macroeconomic policies, or the importance of government intervention in the marketplace is the critical policy lesson that today's nations take away from this historical experience is uncertain. However, governments throughout the world have undoubtedly become more sensitive to their role as protectors, and promoters of their nation's economic security.

The success of the Asian NIEs has also been dependent on their ability to acquire foreign technology, and use it to increase the productivity of their manufacturing industries. Over the last thirty years the diffusion of technology, and the ability of nation-states to acquire and control new technologies have been critical factors in determining their relative economic strength. [Ref. 1:p.1961] These trends seem to be accelerating as the major powers compete to control not only the technologies that will insure a military edge, but those that will help them capture new markets.

Numerous articles have sought to explain the erosion of America's technological superiority over the past few decades. Many analysts conclude that America has inhibited its

own technological advance by overemphasizing the need for more advanced defense technologies, rather than providing the requisite encouragement of private investment in civilian technologies. [Ref. 3] Some authors cite the failure of the United States to make the proper investments in basic scientific education, and in other areas of civil society that would provide the appropriate climate for technological development. However, it is clear that the mere development of a new technology is not enough, private industry must be able to apply advances in technology in commercial processes for it to improve living standards, and increase the relative economic power of a particular nation.

As a result of the rapid advances made possible by the exploitation of technological developments, the main players on the international stage will not discount the impact that technology can have on their national security.

B. THE LIKELY NATURE OF FUTURE CONFLICT

Some authors have asserted that armed conflict between nations has become more unlikely as economic interdependence grows, and as the potential benefits of military adventures decline. They argue that, compared to alternative policies designed to achieve certain national objectives, the option of using military force has become far less viable than it has ever been before. [Ref. 4]

Others write about the promises of “democratic peace.” They see the proliferation of liberal-democratic institutions in nations throughout the world following the end of the Cold War as a trend that will ultimately produce peace among nations.

These optimistic views have intellectual roots that go back to the late nineteenth century (and the late seventeenth/nineteenth century --- Immanuel Kant was a proponent of democratic peace theory). Many English and French believed that intellectual and commercial progress helped to counter some of the misunderstanding and grievances that had led to earlier wars. The so-called “Manchester school” of international relations believed that since nation were growing richer through international commerce rather than conquest, governments would choose to defend their interests with rational discussion rather than threats. In their view:

The fortress of peace were those institutions and inventions which promoted the exchange of ideas and commodities: parliaments international conferences, the popular press, compulsory education, the public reading room, the penny postage stamp, railways, submarine telegraphs, three-funneled ocean liners, and the Manchester cotton exchange. [Ref. 5]

1. Democracy and Peace

In his 1994 State of the Union address, President Clinton declared that “ultimately the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy everywhere.” [Ref. 6] His administration has continued to express the belief that democracies do not fight each other. The idea that democratic nations do not go to war with each other is based on the belief that the values of liberalism promote foreign policies that prevent war. Specifically, the liberal commitment to individual freedom, the pursuit of material well-being, and happiness give rise to foreign policies and governmental institutions that work together to produce democratic peace. It is not that the power politics of realism

do not matter to liberals, but that they see it as part of a larger picture of international politics. [Ref. 7] When the possibility of war between two states that view each other as liberal-democracies arises, liberal elites in both countries will agitate against war and the electorates of those countries will force their governments to steer the conflict off of a trajectory that leads to war.

The worrisome aspect of this hypothesis, particularly for relations among Asian-Pacific countries, many of which are nascent democracies, is that there is the possibility that two potential combatants will not view each other as being of the liberal-democratic tradition. The corollary to the idea that democracies do not fight each other is that democracies are more likely to be goaded into war with states they believe to be illiberal. Since definitions of what constitutes a democratic government are likely to be different for Asians, who have traditionally emphasized the importance of the group over the individual, and family or group loyalties over responsibilities to the nation, the effects of the mechanisms that are supposed to produce democratic peace between nations may not work. (Indeed, many western political analysts view Japan's democratic institutions as a facade for what is really a bureaucratic-authoritarian government). [Ref. 8]

Christopher Layne argues that the current infatuation with the prospects for democratic peace represents the triumph of wishful thinking over observable reality. From his point of view, there is no evidence that a world full of democratic states would negate the structural effects of the anarchy at work in the international system. Nor does economic

interdependence prevent conflict. He thinks that basing national security strategy on a neo-Wilsonian ideology of democratic peace is dangerous for two fundamental reasons:

If democracies are peaceful but non-democratic states are “trouble-makers” the conclusion is inescapable: the former will be truly secure only when the latter have been transformed into democracies too. [Ref. 9] Liberal theory of international politics defines out of existence (except with respect to non-democracies) the very phenomena that are at the core of strategy: war, the formation of power balances, and concerns about the relative distribution of power among great powers. [Ref. 9]

So democratic nations that base their foreign policy on notions of democratic peace run the risk of intervening militarily where their real interests are not engaged and failing to protect vital concerns where they are challenged by other liberal-democratic governments.

2. Multipolarity and War

Some international relations theorists have supported the idea that war has lost much of its utility as an instrument of national policy because of the new multipolarity in international politics. They argue that a multipolar system allows a greater number of interactions among a variety of states, and therefore the danger of two states becoming so focused on a certain, war-provoking bilateral struggle is diminished. Similarly, multipolarity should discourage dangerous arms races between two rival nations since they will not have to match each other's arms acquisitions in equal increments. Instead, the relative military power of loose coalitions will be the critical factor. [Ref. 10] There will be a disincentive for a particular nation to embark on a massive arms build-up since this will provoke other nations into forming a balancing coalition against that nation.

Other international relations theorists argue that since multipolarity increases the number and significance of interactions between nations, it increases the likelihood of conflicts of interest. Furthermore, since it is more difficult to estimate the systemic effects of a conflict between two players in a multipolar world than it is in a bipolar one, there is greater uncertainty --- less stability --- in a multipolar system. It is precisely this uncertainty that may lead nations to make miscalculations about their potential to succeed in securing their national goals through war.

It is difficult to assess the likelihood of future armed conflict based solely on the multipolar models of international relations theory. However, one can make broad assessments about the future character of international conflict by taking into account the apparent trends at work in the latter half of the twentieth century in conjunction with the aspects of multipolarity that seem to fit those trends. Admittedly this kind of endeavor is based more on art than science, but it still offers practical estimates that can be the foundation for sound policies.

C. FUTURE WARS

Armed conflict among major powers is highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. The lethality of weapons of mass destruction, and the obvious stake that the major powers have in the maintenance of the international trade and financial systems are strong arguments for preserving the status quo among them. For the same reasons, the likelihood that small wars will escalate into major conflagrations due to great power intervention is remote.

Civil war will remain the dominant form of violence in today's world. The sort of conflict that has taken place in the former Yugoslavia, and in the states of the former Soviet Union characterizes the kind of localized and vicious warfare that the world is most likely to see in the coming years. These conflicts will end in some sort of settlement, or in the eventual preponderance of one side over the other. Despite the notoriety and horror produced by these struggles, they will have little impact on the distribution of power in the international system.

Wars of military aggression designed to capture (or recapture) foreign territory will be a rare phenomena occurring only in the remote areas of the world between relatively inconsequential nation-states. Most states, including all the major powers, will continue to believe that they stand to gain more by trading with other countries than by fighting them.

[Ref. 11]

Regional conflicts may produce temporary economic or political disruption for players with substantial interests there, but the likelihood that such wars will produce systemic catastrophe for the international system is very low. The reactions of the major powers to these conflicts will most likely be benign neglect or offers to provide mediation and peace-keeping forces. The military response of the major players so often elicited in response to regional conflicts during the Cold War will rarely take place.

D. AMERICA AND ITS ASIAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIPS

On April 18, 1996, the father of the containment strategy, George Kennan, was interviewed during a broadcast of the "News hour with Jim Lehrer." Looking back over the

years following World War II, Kennan lamented some of the grand mistakes the United States had made in its security policy choices. [Ref. 12] He explained that his proposal to contain Soviet expansionism was misunderstood by United States leaders. He felt that a political containment versus a military containment of the Soviet Union was the appropriate response to threats to American interests. While the military containment of Soviet hegmonism in Europe was successful, he believed that the United States could have accomplished more in Asia with a policy of political and diplomatic engagement with the Soviet Union. The Korean War could have been avoided, and the Vietnam War was unnecessary. (No one would listen to John Davies when he described Ho Chi Minh as a nationalist who would use, rather than be used, by the forces of world communism.).

Now that containment strategy is no longer the governing principle behind United States security policy in Asia, America's security relationships need to be redefined in the context of today's threats. First, both America and its Cold War partners need to ensure that their current security relationships are reformed so that each nation will be able to defend their particular interests, and avoid being drawn into disputes that don't affect those interests. Secondly, since multilateral cooperation is required to solve the most intractable threats to United States security - such as weapons proliferation, pollution, economic conflict, etc. - America must avoid forming bilateral relationships that preclude substantial multilateral cooperation. In other words, it is not in America's interest to categorize Asian countries into lists of friends and foes until such an eventuality exists.

II. THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES - JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

A. THE SECURITY TREATIES

In analyzing the origins and current utility of the U.S.- Japan security relationship, one must always bear in mind the historical context in which the first Mutual Security Treaty was signed.

At the end of World War II, Japan was a wasteland denuded of its former industrial might and burdened with a malnourished population that had been drained by years of futile warfare. Its occupation, ostensibly run by the representative of Allied Forces, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was essentially an American affair that was intent on leaving its imprint on nearly all aspects of Japanese society and governance. The Occupation, administered by General MacArthur, in fact had a mandate to drastically alter Japanese society in fulfillment of the broad guidelines enumerated in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established. [Ref. 13]

The Potsdam declaration also stipulated that those Japanese leaders who had "deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest" were to be stripped of all authority. Former Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru felt that these purges coupled with the other reforms initiated by the Occupation authorities were excessive, and went much further than expected. In discussing General Courtney Whitney's (the officer in charge of implementing the purges) tersely written account of the purges, Yoshida explains his memories of those events: If the purging from public life of tens of thousands of Japanese is in fact an unpleasant memory for those responsible, it is equally so with us...It was understandable therefore that the SCAP directive of January 4, 1946, which committed so many leading figures in the nation to banishment from public life, came as a major shock to us. [Ref. 14]

The shocks of a crushing defeat, nearly two decades of military domination, and the policies of a reform-minded Occupation authority left Japan a politically and intellectually confused nation during the years immediately following World War II. Though the objectives of the Occupation authorities were sometimes inscrutable to the Japanese, they were passionate in their support for policies that would preclude Japan's involvement in future wars. [Ref. 15] What was uncertain in the late 1940s was the form of security guarantees that would be put into place to ensure the future safety of a disarmed Japan.

The nature of any future security regime designed to protect Japan from external threats hinged on the terms of the peace treaty that would be imposed upon Japan. Some of the members of the Allied Council advocated a punitive peace intended to hobble rather than

reform Japan. [Ref. 16] Initially, American sentiments were also divided about the terms of peace to be put before Japan. At one end of the spectrum in United States policy making circles was the so-called "China Crowd" who advocated a punitive peace designed to stunt Japan's recovery. They recommended a complete dismantlement of Japan's Emperor system, as well as the zaibatsu system of industrial production. [Ref. 16] The "Japan Crowd," lead by former Ambassador Joseph Grew, were more intent on preserving the Imperial institution as a kind of adhesive that could hold the defeated nation together, and bolster it against the threat of Soviet intervention. [Ref. 16: p. 15]

As the United States and the Soviet Union began quarreling over the shape of the post-war world, it became clear that the newly born United Nations would not be the guarantor of peace as was planned. Furthermore, it became more apparent that Japan would not be able to achieve a comprehensive peace settlement with all of its wartime adversaries.

National Security Council (NSC) Directive 13/2, issued in 1948, recognized the threat that Soviet expansionism posed to Japan, and recommended policies that would reverse some of the reforms undertaken by the Occupation. [Ref. 18] Under NSC 13/2 emphasis was to be placed on ensuring Japan's economic recovery and political stability, rather than purging militarism from their culture. [Ref. 18]

During the early years of the Occupation, Prime Minister Yoshida anticipated a post-war security arrangement that would make Japan permanently neutral and demilitarized (what MacArthur had described as an Asian version of Switzerland). [Ref. 19] Under these

arrangements Japan would need the promises of the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, and other great powers that its neutrality would be respected.

On June 28, 1947, Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi (from Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu's Cabinet) delivered what came to be known as the “Ashida Memorandum” to General MacArthur’s diplomatic advisor George Acheson and to General Whitney. The Memorandum stated that the Japanese government preferred to enter into a special agreement with the United States against external aggression by a third power; and at the same time to build up its domestic police forces on the ground and on the sea [Ref. 20]. Japanese leaders from the Liberal Party, the Democratic Party, and parts of the Socialist Party realized that the Soviet-American split would mean that Japan would have to pick one or the other superpower as a guarantor of its security. They would not be able to depend on the U.N. and its ability to carry out its duties as set forth in the Charter.

Given the make-up of the Occupation forces, the superiority of American air and naval power, and the historic and persistent geostrategic rivalry between Japan and Russia, there was little debate (with the exception of some idealogues) about which camp Japan should pick.

However, at the time the Americans were not ready for the Ashida proposal. General Whitney rejected the memorandum, thinking that such proposals were still premature. [Ref. 21] Ambassador Acheson was killed in a plane crash while en route Washington, D.C., and as a result the copy of the memorandum that he was carrying did not reach the policy makers in the capital. Ashida continued to seek United States acceptance of his plan, and in

September of 1947, the War Department let it be known through unofficial channels that the United States was not ready to conclude separate peace treaties with Germany or Japan. [Ref. 22]

However, the events of the developing Cold War gradually convinced reluctant American diplomats that a comprehensive peace treaty with Japan that would include the Soviet Union, and a newly established Communist regime in China were hopeless. General MacArthur began to press for an early and separate peace treaty with Japan that would end the Occupation. Shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War he issued a memorandum that spelled out his position:

The Japanese people have faithfully fulfilled the obligations they assumed under the instruments of surrender and have every moral and legal right to the restoration of peace...We should proceed to call a peace conference at once. [Ref. 16: p. 254]

The outbreak of the Korean War led the Americans to overrule some of the Allies' calls for a punitive peace with Japan. Negotiations over the terms of the peace treaty began in earnest during the winter of 1950, and concluded with a signing ceremony at the San Francisco Peace Conference. The peace "conference" was held to approve a treaty that had been already completed by Dulles through bilateral diplomacy.

The first Security Treaty between Japan and the United States was signed in 1951. Signed on the same day as the Peace Treaty (September 8) during a simple ceremony held at the Presidio in San Francisco, the treaty was a short document containing a preamble and five articles. The text that had been under negotiation for eight months in Tokyo was released to

the press just two hours before the signing ceremony. [Ref. 16: pp. 280-281] It was the result of very intense, and, at times, unpleasant bargaining between two very important, protagonistic shapers of the United States - Japan security relationship. The positions taken, and measures recommended by Prime Minister Yoshida, and Ambassador John Foster Dulles set the tone and provided a persistent outline for the still ongoing debate between the United States and Japan regarding bilateral security issues.

From the beginning of negotiations Dulles insisted that Japan must bear the burden of maintaining a force capable of defending against a possible Soviet invasion. (According to Nishimura Kumao, who was the chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, Dulles wanted Japan to build a force that include 350,000 ground troops). [Ref. 22: p. 59]

The touchstone of Ambassador Dulles' position, to which he repeatedly made reference, was the Vandenburg Resolution, passed by the Senate in June, 1948, as the basis for United States participation in NATO. That resolution stated that the United States would associate with such "regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." He warned that the Senate would not ratify the security treaty unless it met the requirements of this resolution, and he insisted that "continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" meant military self-help and military action. [Ref. 22: p.60]

Yoshida opposed substantial Japanese rearmament on two grounds. He pointed out the political danger he faced in going against the spirit of Article IX of the new, U.S.-imposed Japanese Constitution which declared that "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war

potential will never be maintained." [Ref. 23] The war-weary Japanese public would have replaced any prime minister who embarked on such a build-up at that time. Secondly, and more fundamentally, Yoshida held Japan was simply incapable of rearming at that point for economic reasons. The preamble of the first U.S.- Japan Security Treaty acknowledged America's willingness, for the time being, to station its armed forces in Japan only in the expectation that

Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armaments which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes of the U.N. Charter. (See Appendix B for full text.)

At Dulles' insistence, Article I also included provisions that made it possible for United States forces to be used to quell internal riots instigated by "outside Powers" [Ref. 24]. The treaty did not include explicit United States promises to come to the aid of Japan if it were attacked. Yoshida had to settle for the American argument that if Japan were invaded they could not remain neutral as long as United States troops were stationed there. [Ref. 14: p. 267] In other words he had achieved only a *de facto* United States commitment to defend Japan.

In general, the treaty reflected Japan's subordinate relationship. In many ways it amounted to a continuation of the Occupation. Some Japanese viewed the document as being one-sided because it provided the United States with the Asian bases it needed in its struggle against Soviet expansionism without giving the Japanese any clear American guarantees to protect their security.

As Japan grew more economically independent during the latter half of the 1950s, its public became more sensitive to the latitude the treaty gave to American forces in Japan. There was a strong public sentiment behind a revision of the treaty. Negotiations for the revision of the Japan - United States Security Treaty began in 1957 at the request of Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke. Foreign Minister Fujiyama Aichiro proposed to the United States that any revised treaty should include the following changes:

1. Make explicit commitments for the United States to defend Japan.
2. Confine Japan's obligations to the limits of the Japanese Constitution.
3. Establish a prior consultation system concerning the the deployment and operation of United States forces in Japan.
4. Set a clear term of validity (10 to 15 years) for the treaty, after which the treaty could be terminated by either party (Article IV of the original Security Treaty specified that termination of that treaty required the approval of both governments. [Ref. 25])

The revised treaty that was eventually signed in Washington on January 19, 1960, addressed many of the grievances the Japanese had with the old "unequal treaty." The new title (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security) reflected the kind of equal status sought by Ashida and Yoshida years before. (See Appendix C)

However, negotiations over the treaty sparked some of the most heated demonstrations Japan has seen in the post-war period. The issue raised by the opposition parties were generally centered on the question of the need for such a treaty during a period

of lessening tensions in the Cold War. Some Japanese called for the immediate abolition of the security treaty, and the adoption of unarmed neutrality.

The specific concerns of those Japanese opposed to the new treaty had to do with possible implications of Article VI:

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

They worried that the "Far East" clause would force Japan to follow United States strategy in the Far East and could involve Japan in a war waged by the United States. [Ref. 25]

The debate in Japan over the treaty turned into a debate over the rules of parliamentary democracy, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) railroaded the treaty through the Diet, with only a LDP-controlled House of Representatives vote conducted. This tactic caused Prime Minister Kishi Nobosuke to be driven out of office. His successor, Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, returned the focus of the country to economics rather than politics when he kicked off his "income doubling" program.

Japanese foreign policy goals set by Ashida, and modified by Yoshida continued to serve as a foundation for Japanese security into the 1990s. The central pillar for both Ashida and Yoshida's national security objectives was the formation of a defensive security relationship with the United States. Yoshida, however, placed greater emphasis on establishing Japan's economic independence than on generating a national defensive capability. He was committed to a lightly armed military force that would not appear threatening to

Japan's neighbors, despite United States demands that Japan provide for an increasing share of its defense.

The course that Yoshida set for Japan's security policy proved remarkably successful for later generations of Japanese leaders. With the nation's focus placed squarely on economic revival Japanese GNP grew twenty fold from 1950 (\$10 billion) to 1970 (\$200 billion). [Ref. 26] The opposition parties that had advocated unarmed neutrality and other utopian policy options lost popularity over the years. The Mutual Security Treaty proved to be a reliable deterrent to foreign aggression, and kept Japan from being directly involved in any foreign war to protect its interests.

Furthermore, by spending just enough on defense to appease United States policy makers, but not enough to build the forces required to obviate the need for stationing United States conventional forces in Japan, Japanese were able to effect a sort of containment on possible United States military adventures. That is to say, while the United States did gain critically important bases as a result of its treaty with Japan, Japan's meager defenses threatened United States policy makers with the possibility of strategic overreach if the United States became deeply involved in conflicts elsewhere.

B. END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE ONSET OF ECONOMIC RIVALRY

From the very beginning of the Cold War, the United States was committed to the rebuilding of Japan and the expansion of its economic strength. President Eisenhower urged United States companies to share technology with Japanese firms and to buy their products. American leadership saw an economically healthy Japan as a source of stability and strength

for the region. The validity of this belief had been proven by the contribution of Japanese industry to America's logistical needs during the Korean War. (The Japanese economy was kick-started by the United States demand for war material, and other supplies).

Trade between the two countries grew rapidly. The Japanese adoption of an export-push strategy administered by a corps of elite, dedicated bureaucrats at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) eventually led to Japan's dominance of markets once controlled by American firms. [Ref. 27] As the Japanese conquered mature industries such as textiles, steel, and automobiles, American producers began to call for protection from their imports.

Americans who had been accustomed to selling more to the Japanese than they bought found the roles reversed in 1965. Ever since then the Japanese have maintained a trade surplus with the United States. Japan trade surplus in merchandise grew from \$2.5 billion in 1975 to nearly \$60 billion in 1993. Both economists and even some politicians in America acknowledge that the trade relationship is based in part on the structural realities of an international system that requires Japan to maintain trade surpluses with countries like the United States so that it can afford to maintain trade deficits with that supply its oil and lumber. However, many Americans believe that its trade deficit is caused by Japan's unfair trading practices.

At any rate, the dispute between the United States and Japan over trade has been and continues to be the cause of serious friction between the two countries.

In 1970, the negotiations over voluntary quotas for the United States import of Japanese textiles collapsed, and marked the first time in the postwar period when the two countries had publicly failed to agree on a substantial issue [Ref. 28: p. 374]. It really was the first time that Japan said "no" to the United States.

The United States government efforts to stem the tide of certain imports from Japan along with attempts to open Japanese markets to American goods continued through the 1980s. None of these measures changed the fundamental nature of the trade relationship; and some have even strengthened the international competitiveness of Japanese firms. A bilateral agreement (negotiated during the Reagan Administration's tenure) on the voluntary restraint of the export of Japanese cars to the United States actually enabled Toyota and Nissan to penetrate new car markets.

The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, and the measures taken by the Nixon Administration to protect a faltering American economy gave further evidence of the shift in the U.S.- Japan economic relationship. The inflationary policies of the Johnson Administration, and an unwillingness by Japan (and Germany) to revalue their currencies, as they continued to pursue export-led growth, undermined the foundation of the Bretton Woods system --- the convertibility of dollars into gold. [Ref. 29] In August 1971, Nixon unilaterally suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, and imposed a temporary surcharge on imports. The Japanese dubbed this event as the "second Nixon shock" (the first shock being his decision to reopen relations with Communist China earlier that summer). These economic measures were both meant to staunch the flow of Japanese-made

imports into the United States However, these efforts did not prevent the Japanese from running a record four billion dollar trade surplus with the United States in 1972. [Ref. 15: p. 367]

Japan's new found economic strength, and the bitter trade disputes between the United States and Japan caused Americans to ask why Japan was not spending more for its own defense. For decades Japan has spent around one percent of its GNP on defense while the United States has consistently spent between five and seven percent of its GNP on the military since the 1970s.

The Nixon Doctrine announced in Guam in 1969 was, in a sense, and echo of Dulles' call for America's allies to bear an increasing share of the costs for their own defense. With America heavily engaged in the Vietnam War, Nixon sought to transfer some of America's burden to Japan: "We shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for their own defense." [Ref. 30]

During the late 1970s the Soviets began an alarming build up of their forces in Asia. Following the conclusion of a treaty of friendship with Vietnam the Soviets moved naval and air forces into Cam Ranh Bay and Da Nang. They also fortified their bases in the disputed Kuril Islands. These events coupled with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and their threats to employ the Breshnev Doctrine to quell the *Solidarity* movement in Poland led the United States to reinvigorate its containment policy. Along with drastic increases in United States defense spending, the Reagan administration called on its allies, Japan in particular, to strengthen their own defenses and improve military-to-military cooperation efforts with the

United States In 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki made a commitment to defend Japan's southern sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles. While this was a very important commitment from a political perspective, in practical military terms Japan still lacked the ability to carry out such a promise.

Suzuki's successor, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, a former Defense Agency Chief and Imperial Navy officer, was intent on increasing Japan's own defense capability, and its share of the burden of maintaining United States forces in Japan. Despite his sincere efforts to lift the psychological ceiling on Japan's defense spending it remained in the neighborhood of one percent of GNP.

In summary, despite consistent goading (or foreign pressure [*gaiatsu*] from Japan's perspective) by the United States to increase their defense spending the Japanese government opted for incremental improvements of its armed forces instead of substantial rearmament.

The Yoshida Doctrine produced economic success which in turn led to United States trade disputes. Japan's increasing capacity but continued unwillingness to pay for more of its own defense in conjunction with its reluctance to give any ground on trade issues earned it the label of "free-rider." Even though Japan did respond to United States pressure in the late 1970s by starting the "Host Nation Support" program (in which it paid an increasing share of the costs required to base United States troops in Japan) and by increasing the interoperability of United States and Japanese forces under the 1978 U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, many Americans viewed these efforts as being insufficient.

C. FROM FREE-RIDER TO ECONOMIC RIVAL

Towards the end of the 1980s, as Japanese companies began to capture large market shares of high technology goods like semiconductors (what Clyde Prestowitz called the "crude oil of the 21st century"), Americans in and out of government began to see Japan as an economic adversary that threatened the United States national security. When the Japanese electronics company Fujitsu submitted a takeover bid for Fairchild Semiconductor, Secretary of Defense Weinberger and executives from the American defense industry voiced their concern. Norman Augustine who was chairman of Martin Marietta said:

Leadership in commercial volume production is being lost by the United States semiconductor industry. United States defense will soon depend on foreign sources for state of the art technology in semiconductors. This is an unacceptable situation. [Ref. 31]

Pat Choate's 1990 book, Agents of Influence outlined Japan's penetration of American society, and its ability to control important political and economic levers in the United States by using its financial clout. Choate chronicled the extensive lobbying effort in the United States conducted by the Japanese government, and Japanese conglomerates. [Ref. 32] The high-profile purchases of American property, and a substantial increase in Japan's direct investment in the United States (before Japan's "bubble economy" burst) seemed to support Choate's contentions, and warnings.

As Gorbachev's *perestroika* produced a less menacing Soviet Union, the apparent threat from Japan's economic and technological advances received more attention from American leaders. Without the clear-cut threat of Soviet expansionism there was little

rationale for continuing to subordinate economic issues between the United States and Japan to military concerns. The end of the Cold War only seemed to underscore the renewed emphasis on the importance of economic competitiveness and the diminishing relevance of military power calculations.

During the Iran-Iraq War, American and NATO warships provided protection to Kuwaiti-flagged tankers (including many Japanese hulls); as a result, the flow of crucial oil supplies from the Persian Gulf was maintained. The absence of Japan's warships from *Operation Earnest Will*, despite Japan's overwhelming dependence on oil from the Gulf, led many nations to question Japan's role in the international community. The parameters of the Mutual Security Treaty that were set to counter a Soviet threat seemed increasingly out of context.

The greatest blow to the relevance of the U.S.- Japan security relationship since the end of the Cold War was brought about by Japan's hesitance to participate in or support the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War. During the war, Americans concluded from Japan's reluctant contributions that the Japanese were not sincere allies who shared the same level of commitment to the maintenance of international peace and order. When the Japanese government did finally come through with a substantial financial contribution to the coalition forces, it simply reinforced the American perception that the Japanese thought that they could continue to buy their way out of international problems, and avoid spilling their own blood to defend their vital interests.

Early in the conflict the Bush Administration had warned Japan about Congressional anger over Japan's perceived free-ride and small role in the Gulf crisis. The Administration also presented the Japanese with five demands:

1. Directly contribute to the defense of the Persian gulf region through the dispatch of personnel and equipment, including minesweepers and transport planes;
2. Provide monetary support for the multinational forces;
3. Provide aid to neighboring countries in the region affected by the crisis;
4. Reveal plans for buying major weapons systems from the United States; and
5. Increase financial support for stationing United States troops in Japan. [Ref. 33: p. 309]

The initial response of the Japanese government (a \$1 billion package) was judged by the Americans to be incommensurate with Japan's economic status. United States Ambassador Armacost warned Japan that its contribution to the crisis would have an effect on its bid for a U.N. Security Council seat; and the Congress made threats to begin withdrawing United States troops from Japan [Ref. 33: p. 310].

Ironically, Japan's eventual contributions to the Gulf War effort was a substantial \$13 billion package, along with a precedent-setting deployment of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) minesweepers to the Gulf after hostilities had ended. Unfortunately, it appeared to be too little and too late from the international community's perspective. What was remembered by the Americans was Japan's insular reaction to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as some Japanese described it as "a fire on the other side of the river."

Following the Gulf War, excerpts from the book The Japan That Can Say "No" ("No to Ieru Nihon) written by Diet member Ishihara Shintaro, and Sony chairman Morita Akio, made their way into the American press. Ishihara urged Japanese leaders to recognize the leverage that Japan could exert on the United States through its control of certain high technology commodities (e.g., computer chips). He denounced Japan's acquiescence to American demands during the Gulf War. The coverage of this Japanese point of view in the American press reinforced United States perceptions of Japan as a economic adversary. A report commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the latter part of 1990, Japan: 2000, asserted that

Mainstream Japanese, the vast majority of whom absolutely embrace the national visions for world economic domination...are creatures of an ageless, amoral, manipulative and controlling culture --- not to be emulated --suited only to this race, in this place. [Ref. 34]

III. THE UNITED STATES IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLICY AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The United States - Japan military alliance continues to exist mostly because both sides have become used to it, and are wary to let it die in the face of future uncertainties. Without the threat of the proportions the Soviet Union once posed, Japanese and American officials are unable to find a solid strategic foundation upon which to justify the current level of military integration. Collective defense requires a clear, common threat to organize against.

It has been very difficult for the Japanese and American militaries to agree on the focus of new combined operations plans to replace the old "Operations Plan 5051" in which provisions are made for the defense of Japan in the event of a Soviet attack. Consequently, it has been equally difficult to generate realistic scenarios for combined United States - Japan military exercises.

The staff of Commander Naval Forces Japan, and the staff of the Commander of Japan's Self Defense Fleet take turns hosting an informal discussion group made up of representatives from various JMSDF and USN commands. A general topic is chosen and naval officers ranging in rank from lieutenant to captain spend a couple of hours discussing it. At one of these meetings in the Spring of 1993, the USN's new "From the Sea" warfighting strategy was discussed. (This new doctrine shifted the USN's focus from fighting a blue-water Soviet navy in a war-at-sea to plans for fighting wars in the world's littoral region against brown-water navies.) The Japanese officers present at this particular

discussion could not see how their navy would be integrated into this new United States doctrine. Some of the discussants came to the conclusion that the Mutual Security Treaty would have to be revised in order to continue meaningful cooperation between the two navies.

A poll conducted by the Chicago-based Council on Foreign Relations in the Spring of 1995 found that more than two-thirds of Americans want their government to remain deeply engaged abroad, but are increasingly unwilling to pay the human or financial costs of doing so. [Ref. 35] The Republican-controlled Congress has picked up on this mood in American public, and has submitted budget legislation that could reduce spending on foreign affairs by a quarter. Americans spent trillions of dollars fighting the Cold War, and relish the leadership role forged during those years, but they do not want to maintain that role at any cost. In reevaluating United States policies in the post-Cold War period, the security relationship with Japan will come under increasing scrutiny since it involves America's defense of an economic superpower.

Anthony Lake has described those Americans who would cut the resources necessary to sustain the U.S.'s current commitments abroad as neo-isolationists who are willing to forfeit America's leadership in the international arena. [Ref. 36] However, if one takes a look at developing conditions in East Asia it is apparent that the United States is already becoming more of a partner rather than a leader in international politics, and economics there. Furthermore, many of the intra-regional disputes in Asia do not engage America's vital

interests directly. The U.S.'s current alignment in East Asia is a legacy of Cold War imperatives, and should be modified to reflect new realities.

Instead the Clinton-Hashimoto summit in April 1996 underscored the importance of maintaining America's current alignment in the region given "the prevailing security environment." The Joint Declaration on Security issued after the summit did not spell out the types of changes in East Asian security that would allow for realignment.

One result of the summit is a source of concern for some of Japan's neighbors, as well as some security analysts in both countries. The Joint Declaration calls on both countries to promote bilateral policy coordination in dealing with "situations that may emerge in areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan [Ref. 37] China wonders if this will mean American involvement in Sino-Japanese disputes. Some Japanese and Americans worry about being drawn into conflicts that do not affect their respective national interests.

The two countries also signed a bilateral "acquisition and cross-servicing agreement" in April 1996. Though this will allow Japan to provide fuel and parts for American forces engaged in UN peacekeeping operations, it really answers American needs for logistical support identified in contingency planning conducted during the Cold War years (America has sought such an agreement for nearly a decade).

There is no doubt about the importance of a cooperative security relationship between the United States and Japan, but that is not the same thing as saying the present alliance

structure should be maintained. The total contribution that the two countries can make to global peace and prosperity must be maximized.

A. THE CHINA FACTOR

Whatever course the United States - Japan security relationship takes will have a direct effect on China's strategic calculations. Conversely, whether an increasingly powerful China chooses to cooperate in the maintenance of the international status quo or it seeks to establish dominance in the region will be an important factor in determining the future levels of United States - Japan security cooperation.

Therefore, United States leaders must have a clear appreciation of China's current foreign policy goals, and the degree to which these goals conflict with American interests before any decision to modify the United States - Japan security relationship is made.

1. China's Influence

China's geography and growing economic clout give it a vital stake in virtually all of East Asia's conflicts of interest. Its ancient civilization and culture have deeply influenced its neighbors, and have provided the basis for communication, and common understanding.

China's cooperation is required to solve Northeast Asia's most intractable and dangerous security issue, the easing of tensions between North and South Korea. China's territorial claims in the South China Sea must be sufficiently accommodated in order to avoid the ever present danger of military conflict there.

The substantial and growing level of economic integration between China and other nations of the Asia-Pacific make China's continued economic health and political stability a

critical factor in determining the future economic vitality of the region. It is for these reasons that both the leaders of the region's governments, as well as the world's financial markets are intensely interested in the outcome of any leadership succession struggles that may place after Deng Xiaoping's death.

Finally, China's position in the world, and its seat on the U.N. Security Council give it an important say in issues that are far beyond the geographical confines of its own region. Without China's acquiescence the United States would never have been able to get a legitimizing seal of approval from the Security Council to mount a multilateral military coalition in the Gulf War. The solution to concerns like the control of weapons proliferation, and the prevention of arms races requires China's active support as both a major producer and purchaser of modern armaments.

Based on considerations such as the ones listed above, President Clinton decided to abandon the linking of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status to China's performance on human rights. Anthony Lake explained this change in policy in the spring of 1994:

Certainly issues like Korea, issues that come up at the U.N., the China vote and veto at the U.N. ---- all of these things reinforce the importance of our having a positive, constructive relationship with China. [Ref. 38]

2. China's Interests in the New World Order

At this moment in history the Chinese view the external security environment of the region as a relatively benign one. The threat from their most dangerous neighbor subsided as Gorbachev removed the "three obstacles" to better relations with China listed by Deng

Xiaoping in 1982 (massive Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet border, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Vietnamese expansionism in Indochina). [Ref. 39]

Through continuing confidence-building measures between the two countries military conflict on the Sino-Russian border seems increasingly remote. The fact that smuggling and illegal immigration are the major border control concerns of the two neighbors is indicative of the drastic change that has taken place in Sino-Russian relations.

The official recognition of South Korea by China in 1993 was an important landmark in the removal of another Cold War vestige in the region. Having a window on both the South's politics, as well as the hermetic North Korean governments, has given China the opportunity to more effectively influence events on the peninsula. China has continued to favor a Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons. As a result it supported the North-South agreement in 1992 for a non-nuclear peninsula. According to former Foreign Minister Han Sun-Joo, it was China's willingness to cooperate with the South Korea and to pressure North Korea that precipitated the October 1994 Framework Agreement between the United States and North Korea. [Ref. 40]

Historically, Chinese governments have not tolerated an unfriendly power in control of the Korean peninsula. China's struggle with Japan, and Russia over this objective in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and Mao's decision to go to war with a superpower in order to drive it from the Yalu River demonstrate China's determination on this point. Anticipating the eventual political and economic absorption of the North by South Korea the Chinese have already established strong economic and political ties with Seoul. The Chinese

see the continued presence of United States troops on the Korean peninsula as another Cold War vestige that serves as a brake on the reunification process. [Ref. 41]

Sino-Japanese relations are decidedly upbeat. The visits of the Emperor, and former Prime Minister Hosokawa to China, along with the contrition they expressed regarding Japanese militarism during the Pacific War helped to soothe China's concerns about Japan's future intentions. Japan's willingness to avoid serious confrontation over the Senkaku (Diao Yu) Islands, and Sino-Japanese maritime borders in the East China Sea are also in line with China's current desires. The July 1996 incident in which a right wing group called the Japanese Youth Federation erected a makeshift lighthouse on Uozuri-jima in the Senkakus illustrates the point. While the Chinese press vehemently criticized the activities of such Japanese groups and called on Tokyo to restrain them, Beijing also prohibited its citizens from demonstrating against the Japanese government. It was content to allow Hong Kong and Taiwanese residents to carry out the at-sea protests in the name of Chinese interests. The Japanese response was also muted with the Maritime Safety Agency actually performing a rescue at sea of one of the Chinese demonstrators.

When Japanese fishing vessels and merchantmen transiting the East China Sea began experiencing armed attacks by semi-official pirates operating from the Chinese mainland, Japan chose quiet diplomacy vice increased military presence to seek a solution to the problem.

Japan's demonstrated commitment to the peaceful resolution of Sino-Japanese disputes in conjunctions with its preference to avoid involvement in what China considers its

"internal affairs" (e.g., human rights issues) have served to strengthen their bilateral relations. Japan's recent refusal to grant a visa to Taiwan's President Lee Tung-hui shows its reluctance to go against Beijing's "one China policy," and contrasts sharply with the shifts in America's Taiwan policy. The Chinese have rewarded Japan's attention to diplomatic form, and its effort to preserve China's face in the international arena. In return for such Japanese consideration, China has allowed Japanese oil firms to conduct drilling operations in the disputed waters of the East China Sea and Beijing has tolerated the flights of Taiwanese airlines between Osaka and Taipei.

Conversely, China's worst fears about the degree to which America was willing to intervene in its dispute with Taiwan were realized in March 1996 when the mainland conducted military exercises and ballistic missile firing near the island. The dispatch of two aircraft carriers (the USS Nimitz never actually was in striking distance at the area) to the region buoyed the mood of voters in Taiwan, and probably shocked leaders in Beijing. It also made the United States' policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding the Taiwan issue far less ambiguous.

China's main concern regarding Japan are the future possibilities of a substantially rearmed Self Defense Force, and the political rhetoric of rightist politicians who deny Japanese atrocities during the Pacific War, and see Japan's wartime "Co-Prosperity Sphere" as an effort to liberate Asia from Western colonialism. While many Chinese admit that there are strong anti-military sentiments among the Japanese people, they believe that Japanese schools have failed to teach its people about the horrors visited upon Asians by the Imperial

Army. This, they think, has caused the Japanese to misunderstand the real concerns of their Asian neighbors about the possible remilitarization of Japan. The Chinese blame American Occupation officials for the failure to fully expose to the Japanese public some of the more heinous crimes committed by the Imperial Army during the war --- such as the biochemical experiments conducted by "Unit 731." The Chinese also blame America's demands that Japan bear a greater share of its own defense burdens on what they perceive as a substantial improvement in Japan's military capabilities over the last twenty years.

Up until the last few years the Chinese welcomed the continued presence of American forces in Japan as a check on Japanese militarism. These days Chinese strategists wonder if current circumstances warrant the stationing of United States forces in Japan, especially if the United States continues to pressure the Japanese into purchasing sophisticated weaponry.

Another more fundamental reason that the Chinese are less comfortable with a continued American military presence in Japan is that they believe that with the Soviet threat gone the United States - Japan alliance is directed against them. The fact that one of the carrier battlegroups that deployed to the east of Taiwan during the elections there in March 1996 sortied from Yokosuka, Japan, demonstrates that American forces in Japan are potentially threatening. They cite the United States' East Asian Security Initiative (EASI) of 1992, and the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region of 1995 as evidence of America's inability to completely overcome Cold War thinking. [Ref. 41] EASI announced America's commitment to the security of its "friends and allies," but glosses over the need to promote the prosperity and stability of other nations in the region. The 1995

document still puts China in a category other than "friends and allies." Furthermore, some Chinese scholars believe that the United States government and the American media are circulating propaganda about what they call the myth of the Chinese military threat in order to scare China's neighbors into cooperating with United States policies. The "China threat myth," they maintain is not just intended to give a future rationale for the United States - Japan Security Treaty, but is also designed for the consumption of Southeast Asians.

China has made great efforts to improve its relations with the nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the last five years. It has attended ASEAN's Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) as a guest, and it welcomes the multilateral security discussions of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). However, it has been China's aggressive stance on its claims to the Spratly (Nansha) Islands in the South China Sea that has given Vietnam, and its ASEAN neighbors cause for concern. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sank two Vietnamese vessels in the area in 1988, and there have been numerous incidents in the South China Sea between the two countries since then. Most recently the Philippines and China have exchanged threats over the Chinese occupation of reefs near Palawan Island.

The Chinese maintain that their actions in the South China Sea do not represent any hegemonic aims, but stem from long, and previously undisputed, historical claims to the islands. In 1992 at the Fourteenth Party Conference the Chinese enacted a "Maritime Territories Law" that spelled out their claims to these disputed territories. The Chinese have called for joint research, and possibly joint development of the area but prefer to avoid any

immediate multilateral effort to determine the ownership of the islands. They are determined to eventually gain control of all the islands and reefs in the Spratlys, but they are content to wait until a more opportune time.

Chinese interests and influence in Indochina are profound and growing. Without China's cooperation the progress made in repairing Cambodia's tattered society would have been impossible. Chinese arms sales to Thailand, and its military assistance to Burma have strengthened its ties to these strategically located countries. Thailand's decision to refuse to allow the stationing of United States prepositioning ships (loaded with war material) in the Gulf of Thailand was made partially because it wanted to avoid offending Chinese sensibilities.

The numerous, and politically powerful overseas Chinese who live in Southeast Asia are another source of political leverage, and financial capital for Beijing. They provide economic and cultural links to the region that can be used by China to compete with Japanese economic penetration there.

In general, China has its own agenda when it comes to international affairs. Its greatest concern about any "new world order" is that it will be one that the United States tries to dominate. China insists it is committed to the peaceful resolution of international disputes, but, at the same time, refuses to be bullied by outside forces on issues that affect its sovereignty. It believes that any new world order must be based on the U.N. Charter, and the five principles of peaceful coexistence pronounced by Zhou En-Lai at the Bandung Conference in 1955:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty;
2. Nonaggression;
3. Noninterference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit;
5. Peaceful coexistence. [Ref. 42]

The Chinese support the idea that nation states should be allowed to choose the social system and the path to national development that they prefer.

3. China's Internal Matters and United States Interests

Since President Nixon and Mao Zedong began normalizing U.S.- China relations in 1972, the most persistent impediment to good relations has been the dispute over what China considers to be internal issues.

China's treatment of its own people has become a domestic political issue in America with many Congressional leaders, and members of the Clinton Administration advocating a harder line towards the Chinese government regarding the issue. As a presidential candidate, Clinton had bashed President Bush for coddling the "butchers of Beijing." He vowed to take a tougher stance towards the aging autocrats. The Chinese leadership did not believe the new president was prepared to revoke the PRC's MFN status over the human rights issue (an action viewed by many Asians as the trade equivalent of dropping an atomic bomb that would produce collateral economic casualties in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the United States). Just as the Chinese leaders estimated, American business interests, and international

pressure forced the Administration to back down from its principled stand on human rights without any face-saving concessions from the Chinese.

Recently one of the oldest, and most fundamental causes of Sino-American troubles, the nature of United States - Taiwan relations, has resurfaced and is threatening to sour other aspects of the United States - PRC relationship. Bowing to Congressional pressure in the run up to an election year, Clinton sanctioned the unofficial visit of Taiwanese President Lee to his American alma mater, Cornell University. China reacted with bitter criticism of this policy reversal. It launched a blitz of negative commentary concerning other United States foreign policy initiatives ranging from human rights to the Mideast peace process. [Ref. 43] China also canceled its defense minister's scheduled visit to the United States; and is probably waiting for an even more important issue that is vital to America's interests to demonstrate the consequences of going against China's Taiwan policy. [Ref. 44]

In response to the show of force by the United States Navy in March 1996, China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that "Taiwan is a part of China and not a protectorate of the United States." [Ref. 45] The leadership in Beijing believes that it could have already peacefully resolved the issue of reunification with Taiwan had it not been for persistent meddling by the United States.

The three joint communiques (the Shanghai Communique of 1972, the December 1978 joint communique on normalization, and the 1982 joint communique on weapon's sales to Taiwan) that are the very foundation of United States - China relations each address the acceptable levels of United States - Taiwan relations. The Chinese believe that Lee Teng-

Hui's visit to the United States, and President Bush's decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan, and the dispatch of aircraft carriers near Taiwan last March, were clear violations of the spirit and letter of these agreements. The PRC's policy of deepening Taiwan's diplomatic isolation is intended as a means of speeding up the reunification of the island with the mainland. Beijing continues to react jealously to any initiatives by Taiwan or other countries that it perceives are contrary to this overarching political goal.

However, the crisis in the Taiwan Straits in March has served as a warning to leaders on both sides of the issue. A military conflict over Taiwan is clearly in no one's interests. While the Chinese harbor resentment for the reaction by the United States they have subsequently welcomed high level visits by national security advisor, Anthony Lake, the commander of the United States Forces in the Pacific, and following the presidential elections, the secretary of state.

4. Weapons and Technology Proliferation

Beijing's sale of missiles and nuclear technology to countries in the world's most volatile areas continues to be a major national security concern to America. The sales of intermediate range ballistic missiles (CSS-2) to Saudi Arabia in 1988 was viewed by the United States as a highly destabilizing development in Arab-Israeli relations. The sale of a large number of surface-to-surface missiles to Iran (including *Silkworm* anti-ship missiles) was also inimical to American interests in the Persian Gulf because of the danger it posed to oil tankers and United States Navy ships. China has provided nuclear technology to Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Brazil among others.

The Chinese are motivated to sell arms, and to transfer dangerous technologies for various reasons that include strategic, political, and economic considerations. China believes that these sales and transfers are no more destabilizing than those of the United States or other more active arms traders. It views this activity as China's sovereign right, and as a means to enhance its international prestige [Ref. 46].

China has been supportive of weapons control regimes like the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). [Ref. 47] However, its continued testing of nuclear weapons still poses a problem for the United States because of the influence this activity has on the ambitions of some states that want to join the nuclear weapons club.

A significant breakthrough for Sino-American relations regarding missile and nuclear material proliferation came during Vice Premier Qian Qichen's visit to Washington in October 1994. After two days of ground-breaking talks between Chinese officials and the Administration, they reached two separate agreements aimed at curbing the proliferation of missile technology, and controlling the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. [Ref. 48] China accepted, for the first time, a definition that satisfied America as to what constitutes a violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). [Ref. 49] China declared that it would not export surface-to-surface missiles "inherently capable" of reaching a range of 300 kilometers with a payload of 500 kilograms. [Ref. 49] This agreement solved a dispute with America concerning China's shipment of M11 missiles ("Hatf" is the Pakistani name) to Pakistan in 1993.

The agreement to control the production of fissile material was made in order to underline Chinese and American support for the NPT. Some people interpreted this development as a Sino-American message aimed at the leader of North Korea. China clearly wanted North Korea to be more accommodating in its negotiations with the United States over the future of its nuclear program.

Some analysts attributed this shift in China's missile sales policy to the improved military-to-military ties between the two countries. The exchange of visitors from the Department of Defense and China's Ministry of Defense (MOD) that began in the Fall of 1993 allowed Secretary Perry to explain United States concerns about such technology transfers. The MOD's desires to improve military-to-military ties, and to encourage United States cooperation on other issues led to the Chinese government's new position on the issue.

As has been demonstrated in the past, the United States will have a very limited ability to unilaterally stop the flow of Chinese arms, and technology. A continued emphasis on the strengthening of international agreements on proliferation, along with extensive bilateral negotiations on the subject are the only ways that the United States can influence Chinese policy.

5. China's Internal Dynamics

The uncertainty of future Chinese military developments along with the possibility of political instability in China are grave concerns for Japanese and American security analysts. The Chinese are in the midst of a *de facto* transfer of power from the old guard to Deng's designated successors. While Deng still clings to life, Jiang Zemin is attempting to

consolidate his power base in the party and the military. Jiang seems to be committed to carrying out the pragmatic ("if it works, do it") economic policies of his predecessor. He is also intent on continuing the Communist Party's monopoly of political power.

Still, the Chinese face enormous socio-economic pressures that will challenge the ability of any Chinese government to handle. Feeding a growing population that is already about 22 percent of the world's population using only 7 percent of the globe's arable land will produce extreme environmental, and social stresses. [Ref. 50] The mass migration of hundreds of millions of displaced farm workers to metropolitan areas will be another source of political instability. The unemployment, and underemployment problems will continue to grow as the government breaks the "iron rice bowl" provided by state firms. Add to this the infusion of political ideas and information (the "flies and mosquitoes" that leaders had expected) from the West that come into China along with increased trade, and one gets a sketch of the dangers faced by Party leaders in Beijing.

These developments have the potential to sour Sino-American relations as they did after the Tiananmen massacre in 1989. The Chinese government blamed the events in Tiananmen Square on the United States policy of "peaceful evolution" (effecting a change in the Chinese government through the corrosive influence of Western thought), and more direct attempts to subvert the Chinese government. Many Chinese leaders believe that the United States is actively pursuing these goals.

Therefore, the potential exists that the Communist leadership may focus the blame of future domestic political disorder on the United States. This, of course, could result in a more reactionary Chinese posture vis-a-vis the West.

6. Conclusion

From 1969 until the early 1980s, the United States and China entered into a strategic alignment against the Soviet Union. This period was characterized both by phases of excitement over the new ties, and occasional mistrust about the actual intentions of the other side. Harry Harding described it as "a marriage of convenience rather than an enthusiastic romance" in which each side worried about being entrapped or abandoned in the three-way, strategic struggle with the Soviet Union. [Ref. 39: p. 297]

In 1996, the geostrategic stakes at risk are not as great, but the prosperity and continued progress of the region depend on significant cooperation, and mutual understanding between the two powers. Both nations stand to benefit from international regimes that limit weapons of mass destruction. United States and Chinese citizens can only benefit from expanded bilateral trade. Neither country stands to benefit from the military conflict that might result if Taiwan declares its independence. Similarly, while the United States does not take a position on China's claims to maritime territories in the East China Sea, and South China Sea, military hostilities in these areas threaten sea lanes that are vital to both countries economically.

The Clinton-Hashimoto summit was interpreted by China as further evidence of a American containment strategy vis-a-vis China. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said the

following in response to the United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: "If their security alliance is being expanded to cover areas surrounding Japan, it could raise a big problem." [Ref. 51]

Since the United States will depend on China's cooperation to solve many of the transnational problems that affect both countries' interests, such as arms control, drug traffic, Aids, refugees, and pollution, it is imperative that they remain engaged politically, militarily, economically, and culturally.

Treating China as a potential adversary may produce such a reality. Putting China in a category other than "friends and allies" creates an artificial fault line in East Asia. [Ref. 52] The Chinese have demonstrated their willingness to cooperate when the United States has opted to pursue engaging and quiet diplomacy, and when the United States does not attempt to meddle in what it perceives as its internal affairs.

B. THE KOREA FACTOR

In the words of Prime Minister Lee Hong-Koo, Korea is at the vortex of Northeast Asia with an overpopulated China, an extremely wealthy Japan, and a geographically enormous Russia as neighbors. [Ref. 53] As a result, Korean diplomacy must be tactful and masterful in order to guarantee its own interests while accomodating those of its powerful neighbors. However, South Korean leaders believe they face the most favorable conditions since the end of the Korean War for the resolution of the issue of reunification with North Korea, as well as other regional security issues that affect them.

Prime Minister Lee, and former Foreign Minister Han Sung-Joo believe there are unmistakable trends at work in the region and throughout the world that support the reconciliation of former Cold War enemies, international cooperation, and openness. South Korea's restoration of normal diplomatic relations with its erstwhile enemies China (in 1992) and Russia (in 1990) are major accomplishments on the road to peace and stability on the peninsula.

South Korean leaders think that North Korean elites are well informed about the economic and military conditions in the South. The North Korean military leaders are under no illusions about the likely outcome of war on the peninsula, despite their aggressive rhetoric. Han Sung-Joo believes that the North continues its war-like declarations, and the large deployment of its troops near the DMZ in order to assure the continued presence of American troops in South Korea. [Ref. 40] According to him, the North believes that the presence of United States troops acts as a brake on the ambitions of South Korean generals who might decide to reunify the country by force.

For these reasons, the South Korean leadership thinks that a war brought on by a sudden attack from the North is unlikely. However, the massive deployment of North Korean troops, artillery, and rockets directly threaten Seoul, and are taken seriously.

Some believe that Kim Il-Sung had lost confidence in his son's leadership and was seeking to put North Korea in a more favorable position before he died. In June 1994, Kim Il-Sung invited former President Carter to Pyongyang in order to end the dispute over the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) inspections of the North's nuclear facilities.

Prime Minister Lee believes that this was a brilliant move by Kim that allowed North Korea to save face, and protect its interests.

The Framework Agreement on North Korea's nuclear program signed between the United States and North Korea in October 1994 is seen by South Korea as just another part of the process that will lead to reunification --- not just an attempt to solve the problems posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Those Koreans who support the Framework Agreement contend that it will help to produce the "soft-landing" scenario (peaceful and gradual) for unification that they predict. Han Sung-Joo believes that the North will eventually accept the terms of the agreement (including a reactor designed and built by South Korea) even if it continues to threaten, and bargain in order to gain further economic or political benefits. Implementing the agreement will force substantial contact between North and South Korea when thousands of South Korean workers go to work in the North, and when the Northerners go to the South for training. This in turn will produce the meaningful North-South dialogue that South Korea has been trying to attain.

Drastically improved economic and political relations with its Chinese and Russian neighbors, and the continued, spasmodic progress made on the Framework Agreement have gone a long way in erasing the legacies of the Cold War on the Korean peninsula.

What Koreans have more difficulty in overcoming are the more ancient antipathies they feel towards the Japanese. The Japanese invasions of Korea in the sixteenth century, and its colonial occupation of the peninsula during the first half of this century left Korea physically, and psychologically scarred. While Korea has flattered the Japanese by emulating

their economic growth strategies, Koreans of all generations are bitterly resentful of the Japanese colonial legacy.

After fourteen years of strained negotiations, South Korea and Japan normalized relations in 1965. The normalization treaty cleared the way for extensive trade relations that caused Japan to surpass the United States as South Korea's number one trading partner. By the early 1990s, bilateral trade between the two countries exceeded \$30 billion. [Ref. 54] However, the treaty did not achieve an emotional reconciliation between the two people. Most Koreans continue to feel that Japan has not sincerely shown remorse for its treatment of Koreans during the colonial period. In the last few years, the issue of Korean "comfort women" who had been forced by Imperial Japan to service its troops provided an example of the kind of unfinished business that has to be concluded.

The attempts by Japanese leaders like Prime Minister Tanaka to reestablish diplomatic ties with North Korea have been viewed with suspicion, and resentment by South Koreans. In spite of the 1969 Nixon-Sato joint communique that linked Japan's security to that of South Korea, many South Koreans believe that Japan still prefers a divided Korea. Even though Japan will provide financing in support of the Framework Agreement, South Koreans were startled, and anxious by Japan's decision to hold direct talks with North Korea in April 1995 when the North was refusing to accept South Korean reactors. [Ref. 55]

1. Globalization of Korea

Because the South Koreans are focused on the future, and their place in the international system, its leaders have called on them to overcome the emotionalism of the

past. President Kim Young-Sam's "globalization" program advocates an opening up of Korea to the global economy; and to expand the depths of its contacts with the major powers --- including Japan.

President Kim views the revolutionary changes at work in world politics and economics as a challenge that must be faced by Korea:

About 100 years ago, we faced a similar global tide of change. At that time Korea failed to cope with it and, in consequence, lost its sovereignty and suffered humiliation and hardships for decades. Korea should have promptly opened itself and vigorously pursued industrialization in order to build a modern nation as quickly as possible. [Ref. 56]

Korea continues to need infusions of Japanese technology, and investment to compete in a borderless global economy. Korean acknowledgment of the interdependence of the region's economies promotes a future-oriented relationship with Japan. President Kim's globalization program also indicates the fundamental changes that have taken place in the U.S.-South Korea relationship. With respect to the security relationship, Korea is gradually assuming a leading role in its own defense with the United States playing a supportive role. The South is no longer content being a military client of a superpower now that the Cold War is over.

Since it joined the U.N. as a full member in 1991, South Korea has actively participated in U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO). The first South Korean PKO forces (the "Evergreen Unit") to be sent abroad went to Somalia in July 1993. The dispatch of the Evergreen Unit was seen by the Koreans as a turning point in their national history. Besides

being a source of increased pride and prestige, it marked the transformation of South Korea from a beneficiary of U.N. help to being a donor. [Ref. 57: p.136] Following the dispatch of PKO forces to Somalia, South Korea has sent a medical unit to the Western Sahara, military observers to Georgia, and the Indo-Pakistani border, and has also notified the U.N. of its capability to participate in Standby Arrangements.

South Korea's Defense Minister Rhee Byoung-Tae visited Japan and Russia in the Spring of 1994 in an effort to promote military friendship and security cooperation with its neighbors. The meeting between the Japanese and Korean defense ministers produced agreements to expand military personnel exchanges, exchange visits of cadet training ships, and enact procedures that would prevent military airplane accidents. [Ref. 57: p. 133]

Koreans see these changes in military roles as a natural consequence of the transformation of the international order. Its attempts to conduct increased military-to-military exchanges, and cooperation are part of the government's foreign policy initiatives for the implementation of globalization, diversification, and cooperation.

2. The United States Role on the Peninsula

The Republic of Korea - United States security cooperation relationship has been focused on deterring a militarily aggressive North Korea during the last forty years. Despite the end of the Cold War, and improved relations with China, and Russia, South Korean leaders think that a United States military presence in the country for the near term is desirable as the South navigates through the uncertainties of the new international environment. However, in the longer term, as South Korea prepares to reunify with the

North (through absorption or confederation) it will undoubtedly want to loosen direct military ties with the United States.

The South Korean people are becoming less tolerant of the stationing of over 35,000 United States troops on their soil. Yongsan, the sprawling United States base complex in crowded downtown Seoul, is a constant reminder of the opportunity costs borne by the Koreans in order to maintain United States military presence. Many Koreans are unhappy with the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the two countries that provides United States service members with a degree of protection from Korean law enforcement procedures. Some South Korean government officials believe the SOFA grants unfair privileges to United States soldiers, and they are attempting to modify the agreement. The most galling aspect of the United States - ROK SOFA is that it is more permissive than similar United States agreements with Japan and Germany. [Ref. 58]

In April 1995, when the Framework Agreement seemed to be faltering, many South Koreans were worried that the United States and North Korea were cutting deals without regard to the South's interests.[Ref. 53] President Kim made it clear that the South would provide financial and technical assistance to the North only under the terms of the agreement. The perception that the United States was willing to accommodate North Korean demands in order to meet its global objective of preserving the NPT, even if it meant that it would have to compromise South Korea's goal of increasing official contact with the North, was frustrating for most South Koreans. [Ref. 59]

However, by April 1996 American and South Korean diplomatic efforts demonstrated more coordination. President Clinton and President Kim proposed a four-party meeting with the North, including China to discuss a lasting peace. Although the Chinese endorsed the plan the North Koreans remain intransigent.

In September 1996 a couple dozen North Korean spies slipped ashore in South Korea from a submarine. The incident led to a massive and bloody man hunt that proved embarrassing for the South Korean military as well as President Kim. In response to the incident the United States led international consortium stopped work on the reactors being built for North Korea in Sinpo. Rumors widely circulated in the press suggested that American persuasion prevented the South Korean government from taking a military response to the North's incursion.

In Han Sung-Joo's opinion the United States - ROK relationship is becoming more normal as South Korea matures. In the past, South Korea viewed the United States as a kind of "big brother" (in the Confucian sense) that looked after its client's interests. Now that the United States and South Korea take their trade disputes to the WTO as equals, and as Koreans feel more able to conduct their affairs independently, it is only natural that a new style of relationship should develop. This development will necessarily extend to security issues as well.

3. The United States - Japan Security Relationship and Korean Interests

Korean security analysts and politicians continue to see the United States military presence in Japan as a check on any potential remilitarization of Japan. They view the recent

qualitative improvements in the capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces as being consistent with Japan's stated goals of improving its interoperability with United States forces, and the strengthening of its own defensive posture.

Any sudden unraveling of the United States - Japan security relationship could produce a more militarily capable, or pacifistic Japan. Neither of these outcomes would be desirable from Korea's point of view since the former might be a direct threat to Korea, and the latter might encourage China to be more aggressive militarily in the region. [Ref. 60]

From the Korean perspective the most preferable scenario is one in which Japan is an active contributor to world peace and order under the aegis of the U.N. The Koreans would rather see Japan devote most of these efforts to the civilian side of peacekeeping such as increased Japanese financial support for U.N. operations, the participation of Japanese nationals in leadership roles (like the work of Akashi Yasushi, Ogata Sadako), and increased official development assistance (ODA) to the world's poorer countries. However, Koreans understand and accept Japan's need to expand the participation of its Self Defense Forces in PKO operations in order to secure its bid to gain a seat on the U.N. Security Council.

The Koreans welcomed the reaffirmation of security ties between America and Japan made during the Clinton-Hashimoto Summit in April 1996. The current status quo in the rest of Asia allows them to focus on North-South issues.

If the United States - Japan security relationship was drastically modified, the Koreans would seek a clarification of Japan's global military role. They would try to establish transparency of Japan's intentions through the formation of a robust, sub-regional, multilateral

dialogue that would include Japan. At the same time, the Koreans would improve its military posture in areas it viewed as deficient. For example, in anticipation of an eventual United States withdrawal from the region the South Koreans have already embarked on a diesel submarine, and anti-submarine warfare programs that seeks to eventually match Japanese force levels and capabilities.

C. SOUTHEAST ASIAN FACTOR

The end of the Cold War has caused significant changes in the security environment in Southeast Asia. Both superpowers have dramatically reduced their military presence in the area as Russian naval combatants, and strike aircraft have withdrawn from Vietnam, and the United States has pulled its forces out of the Philippines. Vietnamese expansionism of the 1970s and 1980s has ended as that country turns its attentions to economic development, and political engagement with its neighbors. The civil war in Cambodia continues but on a less dangerous scale since Vietnam and China have reached an agreement regarding their involvement in the conflict.

The states of ASEAN (Brunei [joined in 1984], Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) have achieved some of the more important goals they set out to accomplish in 1967 when the organization was formed. At the time of ASEAN's inception, the primary threat to the security of the member states was believed to be domestic upheaval, rather than external aggression (although some did worry about Vietnam's intentions). Because economic problems were seen as the cause of domestic unrest, the association sought to increase security of its members by encouraging economic development and

cooperation. The possibility of military cooperation was rejected because the organizers believed that it might lead to external security threats. They also wanted their regional organization to be largely free of the influence of outside powers. However, the members of ASEAN continued to depend on the presence of the United States military in the region as an ultimate guarantee of their external security.

The members of ASEAN have succeeded in suppressing their domestic insurgencies, and most have experienced rapid growth over the last few decades (but not as a result of economic cooperation and integration among the members). While their association has not eliminated mutual suspicions, and numerous territorial disputes between the members, ASEAN has served as an effective forum for containing internal, subregional conflict, and establishing consensus among its members in the face of regional concerns. ASEAN's work in attempting to manage the Spratly Island dispute is a case in point, and will be discussed later.

Recently, ASEAN has attempted to become the core of security discussions for nations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Their desire to recreate on a larger scale the ASEAN deliberative process that "dispenses with prepared texts and [in which] issues are actively discussed in a friendly atmosphere" is innovative. [Ref. 61] Pacific-wide security discussions are a new phenomenon. ASEAN is using these expanded fora to ensure that it has a say in the security structures that will replace Cold War arrangements. Security structures that will largely be determined by the major powers in the region --- China, Japan,

the United States, and Russia. These meetings also allow it to bring attention to local security concerns like the Spratlys.

The two fora spawned by ASEAN that have added to the movement towards multilateralism in Asia are ASEAN's PMC, and the newer ARF. The PMC is held each year after the ASEAN foreign minister's meeting, and includes the members states plus the foreign ministers of America, the European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Korea. The PMC's focus is on economic and security issues. The ARF includes the PMC participants plus former adversaries like China, Vietnam, and Russia. The first meeting of ARF took place in the Summer of 1994 in Bangkok. The meeting was limited to three hours, and did not accomplish much. [Ref. 62] However, these may be the first steps toward a multilateral process that may eventually help to solve conflicts of interest in the region.

1. The Current Role of the United States in Southeast Asia

When the United States began its withdrawal from the Philippines in 1991, other Southeast Asian states felt the need to prevent a complete departure of United States forces from the area. After concluding an agreement with Singapore, the United States moved a small logistics unit of the Seventh Fleet from Subic Bay to that geostrategically located city-state. Some neighboring states initially worried that this would constitute a United States base there. [Ref. 63] When the United States demonstrated that it intended to use the facilities in Singapore to mainly support ships en route the Persian Gulf these anxieties were eliminated. All of the ASEAN states have some sort of military relationship with America that helps to promote a degree of United States military presence in the region. Memoranda

of understanding between the United States and most of the ASEAN members gives United States ships and airplanes of certain numbers access to specific airfields for repair, provisioning, and joint exercises. [Ref. 64] The continued, low-key presence of United States forces in the region is seen as a guarantee against the possible emergence of Chinese hegemonism, and as a means to protect the flow of goods through vital sea lanes.

The 1996 United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security served to ease the concern of those Southeast Asians worried about American commitment to the region. At the same time many ASEAN nations worry about coordinated American and Japanese efforts that could take the lead in managing regional security. The 1996 Joint Declaration specifically mentions the importance of ARF and other such regional dialogues. ASEAN does not want to see any major power coopt ARF. [Ref. 65]

Southeast Asian nations are generally pleased with the level of security cooperation they enjoy with the United States, and are hesitant to improve it in even incremental ways. In November 1994, Thailand turned down a United States request to pre-position six ships loaded with military supplies in its waters. The Thai minister refused on the grounds that it would cause an adverse reaction among its neighbors. [Ref. 66] Southeast Asian states are keen on maintaining their independent, non-aligned position, and seek to avoid military arrangements that may provoke a Chinese response.

The crisis in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 left the region almost entirely mute. It is opposed to China's bullying tactics but does not wish to offend Beijing by saying so. This comment was made by one Southeast Asian diplomat concerning the crisis and the American

response: "China has been around here for 3,000 years. The United States has been out here for 50 years. We figure you are maybe good for another twenty years. But after that you will be gone, and we will be left here alone with China. We cannot afford confrontation." [Ref. 67]

This desire for a more independent control of their own security coupled with their newly created, economic wealth have made this region one of the world's leading purchaser of arms. In 1994, Malaysia bought Mig-29, F/A-18, and Hawk fighter aircraft. Singapore purchased eighteen F-16s, and the Thais have bought a number of air and naval systems from China and Spain. Southeast Asian states continue to professionalize their militaries as they turn the focus of their forces from internal security roles to external threats. [Ref. 68] These arms build-ups reflect the level of anxiety that these nations feel about the intentions of their neighbors, as well as the post-Cold War environment in general.

2. The Spratly Island Dispute and Regional Security

The one current issue that may drive Southeast Asians into a collective security pact despite their intra-regional differences is China's stance on its claims to over one hundred coral reefs, and shallow banks in the South China Sea --- the Spratlys. Until recently China focused its energies on confronting Vietnam regarding its claims to the islands. In 1988, a Chinese frigate sank a Vietnamese auxiliary near Fiery Cross Reef. In the Spring of 1995, the Chinese put up shelters on Mishief Reef near the Philippines, thereby sparking a confrontation with one of ASEAN's weakest members militarily. In 1994, Indonesia learned that China claimed the waters around its Natuna gas field.

China's behavior prompted ASEAN to sponsor a conferences on the Spratlys dispute in 1993. The conference produced an agreement to conduct joint scientific surveys of the area, but avoided the ownership issue entirely. [Ref. 69] While it could not be called a success it did provide the opportunity for representatives from Vietnam and China to meet on the subject. China has refused to rule out the use of force in settling the ownership issue. This has helped to open the way for Vietnam to join ASEAN in July 1995. Following the incident near the Philippines ASEAN made its first collective stand against Chinese assertiveness. [Ref. 70]

The dispute has caused some Southeast Asian nations to turn to America. The Commander-in Chief of the Indonesian armed forces recently sought assurances of continued United States military presence in the area. [Ref. 71] Following the thirty-seventh annual meeting of the Philippines - United States Mutual Defense Board in Manila in June 1995, Admiral Macke, Commander-in Chief United States Forces Pacific, announced that more United States ships will visit the Philippines. [Ref. 72] Also, Vietnam is anxious to establish warm relations with the United States in order to balance China's assertiveness in the region.

United States oil companies are already involved in the dispute between China, and Vietnam over this issue. Creystone Oil Corporation of Denver, Colorado, is drilling for oil under a Chinese contract in an area that Vietnam has leased to Mobil Corporation. (Vietnam is taking its claim in this particular area to the International Court of Justice to order to seek a ruling based on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea.) [Ref. 73]

3. Conclusion

If the ASEAN claimants to the Spratlys are able to peacefully establish a joint development program to exploit the resources in the area, as China is reportedly amenable to, then the Southeast Asian demands for United States security assurances will lessen. The United States has marginal interests in becoming militarily involved in the intra-regional disputes of Southeast Asians unless these disputes threaten to seriously disrupt the flow of vital commodities to the United States. America does have an interest in preventing the emergence of a hegemonic power in the region.

The relative economic importance of the United States to Southeast Asian economies continues to decline. Japanese investment in Southeast Asia has been outstripping United States investment there for years. South Koreans have invested heavily in the Vietnamese economy following normalization of their relations. Since 1990, Prime Minister Mahatir of Malaysia has been calling for the formulation of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that would exclude the United States and Australia, and would represent Asian economic interests.

In summary, the military and economic leverage that the United States once had has declined as Southeast Asian Nations have matured, and as regional interdependence and cooperation has grown.

D. THE RUSSIAN FACTOR

In the late 1970s and early 1980s when the Soviet Union was engaged in a substantial build up of its ground, naval, and strategic forces in its Far Eastern Theater the USSR was a principal actor in the affairs of East Asia. With Russian naval forces rusting at the piers in

Vladivostok, and Petropavlovsk, its ground forces cut by fifty percent in the theater, and the overall readiness of its military steadily decreasing, it has nearly lost its primary means of influence in the region.

The attention of Russian leadership is focused on the "near abroad" --- its former satellites situated nearer to Russia's European, geopolitical center of gravity --- and on maintaining order within the Russian republic by suppressing separatist movements in places like Chechnya. Moscow closely watches developments in the newly formed republics on its western and southern borders due to its historical, strategic concerns as well as its interest in the large expatriate Russian population in these areas. Russians in the sparsely populated Far East have felt ignored by Moscow, and have occasionally threatened to form their own autonomous region during the last few years.

Russia's important Cold War alliances with North Korea, and Vietnam have gradually withered away. It is no longer able or willing to provide these two former clients with economic or military aid. Instead it seeks to expand the trade relationship with South Korea, and has even offered to barter military weaponry for South Korean consumer goods. Russia is also in the business of supplying military weapons to Vietnam's nemesis, China.

Domestic politics in Russia make it difficult for President Yeltsin to conduct a consistent foreign policy vis-a-vis Asia. Within the Russian Parliament there are two broadly defined, opposing groups on foreign policy issues. The "Atlanticists" advocate Russian entry into the Western European community, while the "Eurasians" want Russia to expand its ties with China, South Korea, and India. [Ref. 74] The "Eurasians" have been extremely critical

of Yeltsin's perceived acquiescence to Western interests, and support greater Russian involvement in the near abroad. The far right wing of this group has criticized Yeltsin for abandoning former allies like North Korea and Vietnam. They also have rebuked his willingness to cooperate with the United States and the U.N. in putting pressure on North Korea to comply with the NPT, and in peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. [Ref. 75]

1. United States Interests and Russia

One of the clearest divergences in United States and Japanese foreign policy since the end of the Cold War has been their respective stances toward Russia. While the United States has focused its efforts on encouraging continued political and economic reform within Russia, and has sought Russia's cooperation on weapons proliferation issues, Japan has given priority to the resolution of the Kuril Islands territorial dispute.

At the G-7 Summit in July 1993, the United States and its Western partners pressured Japan into providing Russia with an aid package designed to buttress Russian reform efforts. The previous September Japan had been shocked by the last-minute cancellation of President Yeltsin's scheduled visit to Tokyo for discussions on the Northern Territories issue. This sudden cancellation of his visit to Tokyo, and his subsequent visit to Seoul caused the Japanese to feel even greater mistrust regarding Russian intentions. Japan still refuses to abandon its policy of linking substantial economic assistance to a favorable resolution of the Kurils dispute.

A speech given by President Clinton at Moscow State University on May 10, 1995, reemphasized America's main concerns about United States - Russian relations. The President underlined the importance of Russia's continued commitment to free markets, and democracy, developing a special Russian role with NATO, ending the fighting in Chechnya, working together on proliferation issues, and combating organized crime. [Ref. 76] The only mention of Asia was a reference to the gas attack on the Tokyo subway, and that Russia's cooperation was needed to stop terrorist types of crimes like these. Clinton's speech demonstrates the Eurocentric focus of United States - Russian relations. [Ref. 76]

2. Russian Economic Ties to the Region

Currently the Russian economy can only offer military hardware, and raw materials in its trade with most Asian nations. In fact, it is Russia's arms trade with China that represents its greatest impact on Asian security calculations. So far, Russia has sold *Kilo* diesel submarines, SU-27 fighter aircraft, SA-10 surface-to-air missiles, transport aircraft for use by Chinese paratroopers, along with other weapons systems. More importantly, over three thousand Russian engineers have been hired by China to improve the PRC's own arms industry. [Ref. 77]

China has become Russia's second largest trading partner after Germany. The increased trade along the Sino-Russian border (valued at \$7.7 billion in 1993) has also brought an influx of an estimated 2.5 million Chinese into the Russian Far East. [Ref. 78] These large numbers of Chinese in a sparsely populated part of Russia have caused Moscow

to worry about Chinese irredentism. Stricter controls on the flow of people across the border were put in place in 1994.

Russian trade with Japan is minimal due to the Kurils dispute. However, Russian traders are more visible in Hokkaido, and northern Honshu as they shop for used Japanese cars, and car parts. In Vladivostok four out of five cars on the street are made in Japan. [Ref. 79] Also, Mitsui, and Mitsubishi have joined other oil firms in a \$10 billion, offshore oil and gas development project near Sakhalin. [Ref. 79]

Trade with South Korea has been slowed by Russia's inability to pay off its debts to the Koreans. However, South Korean conglomerate Daewoo has made substantial investments in the Russian Far East that have included a chain of retail outlets, and the construction of a natural gas pipeline.

The port of Vladivostok, opened by the czars as a freeport, is perfectly situated to take advantage of the vast potential for further economic growth in Northeast Asia. Near the borders of China and Korea, with access to the natural resource wealth, and tourist potential of the Russian Far East, it will continue to attract foreign investment. Alexei Arbatov points out that the future of Russia would benefit more than any other country from reunification of the two Koreas on conditions of a market economy. [Ref. 80] Similarly, resolution of the Kurils dispute with Japan would spark economic growth in this area.

3. The Future Outlook for Russian Policy in Asia

While most Russian leaders and security analysts recognize that their position in Asia will remain weak and vulnerable in the near term, they insist upon having a say in any security

arrangements that develop in the region. The nationalistic element in Russian politics continues to have a large influence on Russian foreign policy initiatives in Asia.

In January 1994, during an official visit to Beijing, Foreign Minister Kozyrev outlined the increasing importance of the Asia-Pacific region to world affairs, and the goals of Russian foreign policy in the area.

1. The region's importance for the future of Russia is increasing, primarily because the economic role of the Asian part of Russia is growing. Trade ties with Asia are also growing stronger, accounting for one-third of Russia's trade.
2. Interstate relations in the Asia-Pacific region will be multipolar, as the future lies in cooperation among the leading powers. Russia wants stable, balanced relations with all Asia-Pacific states, and there are no powers or groupings with which Russia has irreconcilable contradictions.
3. The danger of military conflict is low and the importance of the military factor has decreased. Tensions do remain and several problems must be dealt with --- access to seabed resources, a number of border disputes, religious and national extremism in Central Asia.
4. The economic role of the Asia-Pacific region, which accounts for 60 percent of the world's industrial output, will continue into the Twenty-first century. International relations of states will be determined by the extent of their involvement in regional economic relations and their participation in regional associations. Russia welcomed China at the APEC Summit in Seattle and hopes China will aid its entrance into APEC.
5. Economic progress contributes to ensuring human rights. [Ref. 81]

Clearly Russia does not plan to be left out of the economic, political, and social changes underway in Asia.

To date, Russia has made the greatest progress in solving its problems with its most dangerous, former Asian adversary --- China. Following his meeting with Chinese Foreign

Minister Qian in January 1994, Kozyrev hailed the progress made in strengthening Sino-Russian cooperation. "It is now possible for the two powers to coordinate their interests in Asia and worldwide." [Ref. 82] After discussions between Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin in August 1994 regarding the border dispute that precipitated the Sino-Soviet conflict, Yeltsin declared that "for the first time in the history of Russian-Chinese relations the border between the two countries is legally fixed." [Ref. 80] The Russians and Chinese have also agreed to stop targeting their nuclear missiles at each other, and to sharply limit the number of their troops on the border. [Ref. 84]

The drastic reduction in Sino-Russian tensions appears to increase the prospects for peace in the region, and brightens the possibilities for further cooperation on economic and security issues. However, this development also allows China to concentrate its attention on other security concerns, and goals. Depending on China's intentions this could either cause China to be less cautious in asserting itself militarily elsewhere; or it might lead to a China that is more content with the status quo and the promotion of further security cooperation with its other neighbors.

Alexei Arbatov warns that the present slant of Russian foreign policy in favor of China could put Moscow in a position of dependence on Beijing in the region. Therefore he advocates the conclusion of an agreement with Japan on the Kurils, and the implementation of confidence building measures that would reduce naval tensions between the two countries. [Ref. 80] In the Fall of 1994, the JMSDF and the Russian Navy conducted their first joint Russian-Japanese naval exercise --- a rescue at sea operation. However, the shooting

incidents in the Kurils in which Russian border guards have wounded Japanese fishermen caste a cloud over Russian-Japanese relations.

Arbatov also sees a unified and strong Korea as being in Russia's security interests as well as its economic ones. [Ref. 80] An independent, and militarily capable Korea would be a check on Chinese and Japanese ambitions.

The ability of Russia to expand its influence in Asia largely depends on whether it can put its own house in order. The domestic political fight over Russia's military adventure in Chechnya has split the country, and has dramatically weakened Yeltsin and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's political base. [Ref. 84] Russia's humiliation at the hands of a group of Chechen terrorists caused the Parliament to approve a motion of no confidence in Yeltsin's faltering government in June of 1995. Even though Yeltsin was re-elected in 1996, his poor health and fractured government indicate that political stability in Russia is still at stake. Conservative leader Alexander Lebed's popularity reportedly remains high after his dismissal by Yeltsin as national security chief. With the Russian constitution concentrating power in the hands of the president, there are worries in the West that Russia might drift back towards autocracy if the next elections produce a more conservative presidency. In his May 1995 speech in Moscow, President Clinton urged Yeltsin and the Parliament to stick to their pledges to retain democratic transitions of power. [Ref. 76]

Relations with the United States will continue to focus on conflicts of interest in Europe, and on certain grand strategic issues that will have an impact on Asia. Once an agreement with Russia is reached on the expansion of NATO membership, an important

stumbling block in United States - Russian relations will be removed. This, of course, will have positive effects on any efforts of the two countries to deal with mutual concerns in Asia.

United States efforts to build a ballistic missile defense system have been viewed by the Russians as a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Given the apparent intention of the Republican Congress to proceed with research and testing of such systems, it is likely that the United States and Russia will spend a lot of time trying to reach a mutually acceptable modification to the ABM Treaty. [Ref. 85] If Japan buys a U.S.-designed ABM system, as the United States hopes, this will also modify the Asian military balance.

Some Asian, and American defense analysts continue to see Russia as a medium to long term threat. People like Norman Polmar point to the Russian commitment to improve its nuclear submarine force despite the economic adversity faced by its government as evidence of their intentions. The CIA and the Office of Naval Intelligence are in disagreement about the Russian's ability to produce numbers of quieter submarines. [Ref. 86] Which ever position is correct, the continued presence of Russian ballistic missile, and attack submarines in the Sea of Japan, the Western Pacific, and off the United States Atlantic coast demonstrates Russia's desires to be taken seriously in both hemispheres.

IV. JAPAN IN SEARCH OF A NEW POLICY AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR

A. DETERIORATING IMAGE OF UNITED STATES IN JAPANESE EYES

Even prominent Japanese politicians and opinion-makers who have a reputation for being pro-U.S. are sometimes quoted in the American press making what many Americans consider to be scandalous remarks about the deteriorating state of United States society. Typically, they refer to the growing laziness of American workers, the low levels of education and literacy of most Americans, and the problems caused by drugs and racial strife in the United States. The caricature of smiling Japanese politicians or businessmen wearing the required dark suits and glasses, and berating America's work ethic has been used as parody in "Saturday Night Live" skits as well as American political cartoons. However, among many Japanese there is a commonly held perception that America's social and economic problems are profound and, as a result, call into question the wisdom of following America's lead on international political and economic issues.

In a lecture given at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in October 1994, Professor Matsuyama Yukio, a prominent journalist and political analyst, explained what could best be described as America's fall from grace in the eyes of a generation of Japanese who had experienced defeat at the hands of an industrial giant, had been saved from starvation by United States largesse, and now see a selfish, splintered America that lacks vibrancy and self-confidence. Among younger generations of Japanese, the current impressions of America are not tempered by the experiences of those who lived in its shadow in the 1940s and 1950s.

Kenbei (contempt for America) is more common among these younger generations of Japanese businessmen and bureaucrats who see their future being increasingly influenced by forces outside of United States - Japanese connections.

Within the various bureaucracies, the best and brightest of the younger bureaucrats are no longer drawn to departments that focus directly on United States - Japan bilateral issues. In the Defense Agency, peacekeeping operations and developing ties with regional militaries are part of the new frontier. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) those bureaus that deal with foreign economic affairs and expanded European and Asian affairs are more attractive. [Ref. 87] [Ref. 88] For the past several years, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats have been able to strengthen their domestic political positions, or advance their careers by standing up to American demands. Sakakibara Eisuke, a negotiator from the Ministry of Finance during the United States - Japan Economic Framework Talks in 1994, was promoted to Director General of the International Finance Bureau after gaining a reputation for being a tough negotiator. After flatly rejecting a United States - proposed draft agreement during the Framework Talks, he was quoted as saying "when I taught at Harvard, I would have given an 'F' to such an examination paper." [Ref. 88]

Ambassador Ogura Kazuo, a long-time MOFA bureaucrat and student of the United States - Japan communication gap, explains the United States - Japanese friction as the result of different national courses. "It is we might say a gap between a disoriented people and an idealistic empire." [Ref. 89] He and other Japanese leaders see the need to maintain aspects of the U.S. - Japan security relationship. However, they are insistent that Japan, at times, must

diverge from American policy. Ogura says, "There is no need for Japan to follow the United States in Asia diplomacy; Japan should construct a new axis for its Asia diplomacy." [Ref. 88]

B. THE CHINA FACTOR

Japan and China signed a Treaty of Friendship with each other in August 1978, six years after Prime Minister Tanaka's visit to Beijing, and the establishment of normalized Sino-Japanese relations. The reason that such a treaty took so long to conclude was that Japan was hesitant to be drawn into the triangle of power politics going on among the United States, China, and the U.S.S.R.; and Japan's inability to get China to acknowledge its claims over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands. China was intent on aiming the Sino-Japanese treaty at the Soviets by including an anti-hegemony clause that clearly referred to perceived Soviet ambitions. Japan eventually agreed to accept a more omni-directional clause that became Article II of the treaty:

The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. [Ref. 90]

Ironically, this part of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship may have a new, and more important relevance to current Sino-Japanese relations. As the two countries increase the level of their bilateral trade and the frequency of their official and unofficial contacts, they still eye each other's future intentions warily. Their neighbors in the region are also waiting to see if either country develops the hegemonic ambitions that both have foresworn.

Many security analysts believe that Japan or China will emerge as the dominant Asian power in the Twenty-first century and, as a result, will have the greatest influence on the formation of security relationships in the region. An article in the Christian Science Monitor put China in the lead in the Sino-Japanese competition for influence in Asia. [Ref. 91] Citing an Asahi Shimbun poll that showed a lack of confidence in Japan's international leadership ability, along with China's growing relative economic strength and its aggressive stance in international fora (as compared to Japan's timidity), the article sees a Japan that is quickly becoming a second rank power. [Ref. 91] However, by most accounts, this kind of conclusion is extremely premature --- especially given China's internal political and social problems. Japan still displays a willingness to compete with or confront China in areas where their interests clash.

One issue that was left unresolved by their Treaty of Peace and Friendship was the two countries' claims over the Senkaku Islands, and other maritime territory in the East China Sea. Deng Xiaoping gave the Japanese repeated assurances that the issue would be shelved, and that China would not repeat a 1978 incident in which over one hundred Chinese fishing boats were sent to the area to protest Japanese claims. [Ref. 92] However, a year after he made those promises China sent fifty fishing boats to the islands to protest Japan's construction of a helicopter pad on Senkaku Gunto (Diaoyu Dao). [Ref. 92] In 1990, the Taiwanese brought attention to the dispute when two fishing vessels carrying members of the opposition (Democratic Progressive) party, as well as a contingent of Taiwanese athletes,

attempted to land on the islands in order to run a torch relay to reinforce Taiwan's claims to the Senkakus. [Ref. 69]

In July 1996 a Japanese ultra-rightist group called *Nihon Seinen Sha* (Japan Youth Federation) put up a makeshift lighthouse on Uozuri-jima sparking a vociferous and active response from China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. Beijing limited its reaction to severe condemnation of the group's activities, and called on Tokyo to dismantle the lighthouse. However, some Hong Kong residents, and Taiwanese conducted anti-Japanese demonstrations. In the fall of 1996, some at-sea demonstrations were held during which a Hong Kong resident drowned.

The most disturbing developments from Japan's point of view began in February 1992 when China's Fourteenth Party Congress passed its "Territorial Waters Law":

Article II

PRC territorial waters are the sea areas that touch the Chinese territories. These territories include the continent of China, Taiwan, and the Senkaku Islands....

Article VI

...military ships must be granted permission to sail through Chinese territorial waters by the PRC government. [Ref. 69]

The Japanese were caught off guard by this assertion of Chinese territorial claims. Thinking that China had intended to handle the issue quietly, the Japanese government was confused about how to interpret China's motivations.

During the same time-frame, attacks upon Japanese fishing and merchant vessels that were operating in or transiting the area began to increase. From 1991 until the Spring of 1993 over sixty-five incidents occurred in which Japanese vessels were either chased, shot at, or boarded by Chinese-crewed vessels in international waters. [Ref. 93] Most of the incidents occurred in an area of the East China Sea that both countries claim as being part of their maritime economic exclusion zones. Since it was apparent that at least some of the incidents involved Chinese officials, the Japanese government interpreted these actions as being part of the PRC's policy. While Japan recognized China's need to control the enormous smuggling (cigarettes, guns, drugs, and people) operations that take place off of its coast, it was disturbed by the level of force employed, and a trend that showed the attacks occurring much closer to Okinawan waters. The Japanese also suspected that the Chinese government was using these incidents to gain *de facto* control over disputed maritime territories by scaring away Japanese vessels.

Japanese reaction to these perceived threats was direct. In December of 1991, the Japanese embassy in Beijing requested that the PRC investigate incidents in which Chinese-flagged vessels fired shots at Japanese vessels near the Senkaku Islands [Ref. 94]. The Japan Maritime Safety Agency (MSA) increased its surface and air patrols in the area, and eventually established an office in Okinawa that was specifically charged with monitoring such incidents. [Ref. 85] Coordination between the MSA and JSDF (particularly the JMSDF) was enhanced in response to this new danger. By July of 1992, the Japanese finally got the Chinese government to admit that its vessels had been involved in some of the attacks when

Japanese officials presented Beijing with photographic, as well as other evidence that proved their complicity. [Ref. 96] In February 1993, China issued an official apology for their involvement in the attacks. By the Summer of 1993 the two governments had held several formal and informal meetings to discuss ways of preventing these incidents in the future. Working level meetings between the MSA, JMSDF, Japan's Fisheries Agency, and China's Public Security Ministry, custom authorities, and Navy helped to establish specific procedures that would prevent more illegal acts against Japanese vessels in the East China Sea. [Ref. 97]

While smuggling and anti-smuggling operations are as lively as ever along China's southeastern seaboard, incidents involving attacks against or illegal inspections of Japanese vessels in these waters have nearly ceased since the Summer of 1993. [Ref. 98] [Ref. 93] Elsewhere, Chinese ships continue to be involved in piracy or aggressive anti-smuggling operations (depending on one's point of view). [Ref. 98]

The constructive and forthright way in which China and Japan handled what could have been a potentially explosive issue may serve as a model for resolving similar Sino-Japanese conflicts in the future.

1. Broad Security Concerns

Japan's 1996 defense white paper upgraded its "watch" on China. Tokyo recognizes that China is going to need more attention from the Self-Defense Forces. [Ref. 93] It is concerned about what China's growing defense budget and improving military capabilities will mean for the future of the Asian security environment.

In 1987 the PRC and Japan began a series of military-to-military talks designed to improve mutual understanding about each other's capabilities and intentions. The talks were suspended following the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In the Spring of 1994 these talks were resumed. The Japanese hope to encourage greater transparency in Chinese defense programs, and to allay Chinese fears about Japan's acquisition of improved weaponry. At the 1994 meeting, the Japanese asked the Chinese to publish a white paper similar to the one published every year by Japan's Defense Agency. [Ref. 99] The Chinese appear hesitant to be as open as the Japanese are about their defense programs. However, the exchange of briefings between the United States Department of Defense and the Chinese military in the Spring of 1995 regarding defense issues may signal China's willingness to become more involved in such broad-based confidence-building measures.

In February 1995, the Chairman of the Joint Staff of the JSDF, Nishimoto Tetsuya, visited China and South Korea for discussions on security issues. During his meeting with the Chinese, he reiterated Japan's desires that China disclose details of its armaments and overall defense budget. [Ref. 101] He also expressed Japan's concern about the possibility that the Spratly Islands' dispute could affect sea lanes that are vital to its interests. [Ref. 101]

Japan is particularly worried about Chinese actions that will spark arms build-ups in the region. Some of the menacing statements that China has made toward Taiwan regarding its bid for a more independent international role, as well as China's military moves in the Spratlys, have already caused nations in the region to upgrade their defensive capabilities.

Japan's ODA is specifically linked to four criteria: the extent of military spending in the recipient country; the degree of its arms imports or exports; the country's development and possession of weapons of mass destruction; and, finally, its level of democracy. [Ref. 102] Although Japan, unlike the United States, has been reluctant to criticize China over its weapon exports, it has repeatedly requested that China halt its nuclear testing. In October of 1994, China conducted its forty-first underground nuclear test despite international attempts to establish a moratorium on nuclear testing. Foreign Minister Kono Yohei called the test "regrettable," and called for a reexamination of ODA assistance to China. [Ref. 103] Following another Chinese underground nuclear test in the Spring of 1995, Japan announced that it would cut grant aid to China. This was the first time that Japan used cuts in its economic aid to protest Chinese policy. [Ref. 104]

Despite the worries that Japanese leaders have about the future capabilities of an emergent China, many Japanese think that an image of a "China threat" is being used by American and Japanese officials to gain the public's acceptance of a continuing United States - Japan security relationship. [Ref. 105] The Japanese government is also more confident in the stability of the Chinese government than are American officials. Foreign Minister Kono responded skeptically to a recent Pentagon report on the possibility of China breaking up into semi-autonomous political regions after the death of Deng Xiaoping. Kono said

I do not think that China will move toward disintegration after his death. The country will rather promote its march toward moderate democratization. [Ref. 106]

China is also less concerned with Japan's current military and political posture than what future changes might bring. Analysts at the Chinese Academy of Social Science in Beijing fear a creeping improvement in Japan's military capability that might lead it to acquire a significant capability for offensive action. [Ref. 107] They point to Japan's extremely capable navy, and Japanese discussions of acquiring aircraft carriers in order to conduct PKO, and rescue operations as evidence of the organic improvements that could lead to a militarily aggressive Japan. [Ref. 107] The Chinese also worry about the United States pressure on Japan to improve its self-defense capabilities through the purchase of advanced, American weapon systems. The Chinese have warned the United States about the regional instability that would be caused if an advanced ballistic missile defense system were deployed in Japan or South Korea. [Ref. 103] They fear that their nuclear deterrent could be made obsolete, and therefore, make them vulnerable to a nuclear first strike if its neighbors possessed such capabilities.

2. A Mutual Understanding

In general, the bilateral economic and political ties between Japan and China have developed rapidly despite the stormy relationship between Japan's security partner and the PRC. In 1991, bilateral trade between the two countries reached \$22.8 billion [Ref. 54] This was the same year that the value of Japan's exports to Asia surpassed its exports to the United States [Ref. 38]. In 1992, the Japanese business leader Kobayashi Yotaro urged Japan to work with China in order to develop a relationship that would make them "co-chairman" of the region. [Ref. 109] From 1990 to 1993, Japan's direct investment in China grew from

\$350 million to \$1.5 billion. [Ref. 38] Enthusiasm among Japanese companies interested in increasing their offshore production sites in China continues as the consumer markets in China expand.

The Japanese government has also been more accommodating towards China on trade issues than either the United States or European governments. In MITI's annual blacklist of unfair trade partners for 1995, China was praised for its progress on improving the uniformity of the trade system employed by its various regions, while the United States received the most "black balls" of any of the trading partners listed. [Ref. 110] In contrast, the United States blocked China's bid to join the World Trade Organization in 1994 and early 1995.

Japan has worked to prevent the political isolation of China when the PRC's relations with the West were faltering. It has also attempted to put wartime memories to rest by sending Emperor Akihito (in 1992) and its prime ministers on goodwill visits to China. Although Japan initially joined the West in imposing sanctions on China following the Tiananmen Massacre, it was the first to put its bilateral relations with China back on a normal footing. Prime Minister Kaifu was the first leader of a major industrialized democracy to visit Beijing following the events in Tiananmen when he made a visit to China in August 1991.

Japan is sympathetic with China's assertion that economic development forms the basis for human rights. The Japanese have been careful to avoid becoming involved in what the PRC calls its "internal matters." Japan's recent refusal to allow Taiwan's President Lee to visit Tokyo was meant to appease China's demands that it respect its "one China" policy.

The events of March 1996 put Japan in a very uncomfortable position. While it is opposed to China's use of military exercises to intimidate the Taiwanese electorate it certainly would prefer that United States forces stationed in Japan not be used to openly confront China. Japan is well within striking distance of Chinese ballistic missiles (as are certain cities on the American west coast). It does not want to be drawn into a conflict caused by military decisions made in Beijing and Washington.

In short, the Japanese believe that they enjoy a special relationship with China that goes back to the age of the Japanese regent Prince Shotoku (574-622), and is based on a common cultural heritage. From the Japanese perspective, there is a strong incentive for both countries to cooperate on both economic and political fronts. They believe that, while there is a danger of future conflict between the two powers, the current Asian security environment offers the opportunity to develop mechanisms that can deal effectively with destabilizing disputes.

C. THE KOREA FACTOR

As one of the most serious victims of past Japanese expansionism, Korea is understandably anxious about how Japan's future role in the region will develop. However, Koreans are also aware that a more influential Japan is inevitable and necessary now that the Soviet Union has collapsed and America's relative power has declined.

From Japan's point of view the stability of the Korean peninsula has always been vital to its interests. It went to war with China in 1894, and Russia in 1904 in order to ensure that Japan, and no other foreign power would exercise control over the peninsula. During the

Korean War it gladly served as a storehouse and rear base for the U.N. forces fighting the invaders from the North. Recently, when it appeared that North Korea was developing nuclear weapons, and a ballistic missile delivery system, Japan became directly involved in the crisis in order to guarantee that its interests would be protected. Though Japan worked with the United States and South Korea to eventually secure the United States - North Korea Framework Agreement, it did not hesitate to explore independent avenues, or attempt to block United States initiatives that it considered to be unproductive. Japan was not supportive of the United States when it threatened economic sanctions against the DPRK, and North Korea made it clear that Japan might be targeted in a war that it said would certainly result if such sanctions were imposed. During the impasse over North Korea's reluctance to accept a South Korean-built reactor, Japan sent a high-ranking delegation made up of senior politicians from each of the three ruling parties to North Korea. Arriving in late March 1995, the delegation laid a wreath at the base of a huge bronze statue of the late Kim Il-Sung, reached an agreement to reopen talks on normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries, and made offers of massive economic aid in the form of compensation for the Japanese occupation of Korea from 1910 to 1945. [Ref. 111]

While many Koreans suspect that Japan prefers a divided, and inward-looking Korea to a unified peninsula, it appears that the Japanese are preparing for the latter eventuality. It is in Japan's interest to facilitate a "soft-landing" scenario for Korean unification. A war between the North and South would not only cause Japan to be flooded with refugees from South Korea --- including the family members of thousands of American servicemen --- it

could also result in direct attacks on Japanese soil either in the form of ballistic missiles or terrorist attacks. In a soft-landing unification scenario, Japan will have more leverage over the terms of reintegration of the DPRK and ROK. Because South Korea will need Japanese technological and financial support to improve the North's infrastructure Japanese influence on the peninsula will increase. [Ref. 112] Japan will probably gain economic concessions from Korea as compensation for its willingness to invest more money in the North. Since 1971 Japan has invested more money in South Korea's industrial plants, equipment, and inventory than any other foreign country. [Ref. 113] The mineral wealth, cheap labor, and geographic location of North Korea make it the ideal target of such future Japanese investment once it adopts a more market-oriented economy.

Japan will also want to ensure that a unified Korea goes through a substantial demilitarization process. This will probably be another precondition for Japan's shouldering some of the costs associated with the reunification process.

In the meantime, Japan will seek to "denuclearize" the peninsula; and continue to monitor the ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. The successful test launch of a North Korean ballistic missile ("No-Dong -1") with an estimated range of over 1,000 kilometers in May 1993 caused Japan to reevaluate its threat prioritization. The event was particularly disturbing to the Japanese since the missile was launched into the middle of the Sea of Japan on a line of bearing pointing to the geographic center of Japan. [Ref. 114] This new vulnerability to immediate attack from North Korea will probably lead Japan to deploy a TMD system in the near future.

1. Security Cooperation with South Korea

Even though both Japan and South Korea were on the same side of the bipolar, Cold War struggle, the two countries rarely interacted on security or defense-related issues. Most of the contacts were made in the context of U.S.-sponsored exercises like RIMPAC (exercises that Japan and South Korea viewed as "bilateral" evolutions between the United States and them). United States officials were often used to relay their mutual concerns regarding security issues. However, in recent years Japan and South Korea have made the initial steps in establishing a bilateral security dialogue.

In November 1994, the two countries held the first working-level dialogue between defense officials in Tokyo. South Korean Defense Minister Yi Pyong-Tae, and the Japan Defense Agency Director General Aichi Kazuo agreed to discuss the general security climate of Northeast Asia with particular emphasis on the United States - North Korean Framework Agreement, as well as plans for the mutual visits of training squadrons and other military units. [Ref. 115] In February 1995, the two countries agreed to establish provisions that would prevent accidental military engagements between the ROK Air Force and the Japan Air Self Defense Force. The agreement will allow the two countries to exchange flight information in their overlapping air identification zones. [Ref. 116] This is the kind of confidence building measure that will help to reduce mutual suspicions between Japan and Korea.

Japan has exhibited good will and a desire to cooperate with South Korea in its recent dealings with North Korea. When North Korea recently turned to its ancient nemesis, Japan,

for shipments of rice in order to relieve chronic food shortages, South Korea requested that Japan break off talks on food aid for the North until it reached its own aid agreement with the DPRK. Japan complied with the South's request. Subsequently, the ROK began its own shipments to the DPRK of what will amount to 150,000 tons of rice. [Ref. 117] South Korea hopes that these shipments will help to foster North-South diplomatic activity. Although the North Koreans have stepped up their official, verbal abuse of the South recently, the DPRK promised to release eight South Korean fishermen captured in North Korean waters on May 30, 1995. Japan also showed its solidarity with South Korea when it declared its support for maintaining the ROK's central role in constructing a reactor in North Korea as stipulated during the negotiations of the Framework Agreement.

2. The Future of the Relationship

Although South Koreans still have bitter memories of their Japanese colonial interlude, the two peoples are gradually overcoming the barriers to mutual understanding put in place by that experience. In August 1993, Seoul announced that it would halve the list of banned Japanese imports over a five year period. [Ref. 118] During the Fall of 1994, South Korea agreed to lower the barriers to cultural exchange with Japan. While a display of traditional Japanese crafts at the Japan cultural center in Seoul drew protests that caused damage to some of the display cases, a Japanese rendition of "Jesus Christ Superstar" was well received by South Koreans. [Ref. 119]

On the political front a meeting between President Kim Young-Sam and Prime Minister Hosokawa in November 1993 was more successful than previous South Korean -

Japan summits. Hosokawa apologized for Japan's treatment of Koreans during the colonial period with specific references being made to the emotional "comfort women" issue. Prime Minister Murayama has also attempted to resolve the issue of compensating former comfort women --- most of whom were Korean. On July 19, 1995, he issued an apology to all the women who Imperial Japan had forced into prostitution in the service of its military. He made this apology at the inauguration of a private fund called the "Asian Peace and Friendship Foundation for Women" that will give money to surviving comfort women. [Ref. 120] Many critics of this new initiative believe the Japanese should do more to compensate these victims.

The war-apology resolution adopted by the Japanese Diet on June 9, 1995, also fell short of what many of Japan's neighbors think is necessary to close that chapter of Asian history. The resolution expressed Japan's remorse for suffering that it inflicted on its neighbors, but did not give an explicit apology. [Ref. 121] Comments by the likes of former Foreign Minister Watanabe, who also headed the recent delegation to North Korea, also did not ease Japanese-Korean animosities. A few days before the vote on the war-apology resolution he said that Japan's rule of Korea had been "peacefully negotiated with the Korean government of the day." [Ref. 121]

Clearly, the reconciliation between Japan and Korea will be a long and painful process. However, the economic and political interests of both countries will force the two countries to reach a deeper level of common understanding as the Twenty-first century approaches, and as they begin to exercise more independent control of their security policies.

D. SOUTHEAST ASIAN FACTOR

Japan has been trying to transform its established economic clout into political influence in Southeast Asian affairs. Its first attempts in the post-war era to exercise leadership on regional security issues occurred during a meeting of ASEAN nations along with representatives of seven other nations in Kuala Lumpur in July 1991. At the meeting, Japan's Foreign Minister proposed the establishment of an annual forum on regional security matters. [Ref. 109: p. 14] In January 1993, then Prime Minister Miyazawa visited Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Brunei. Again he emphasized Japan's intention to play a more active, and constructive role in promoting regional security. He called for new thinking

...about how we should shape cooperation between Japan and ASEAN countries with the future of the Asia-Pacific in mind, and about the role Japan should play in this regard. [Ref. 122]

Miyazawa also attempted to quiet Southeast Asian fears about a resurgence of Japanese power in the region in the wake of the United States withdrawal from the Philippines, and the historic deployment of Japanese peacekeepers to Cambodia in the Summer of 1992. [Ref. 123] To demonstrate that they are not intent on filling power vacuums in the region, the Japanese have consistently supported America's continued engagement in Southeast Asia. Japan has also avoided Southeast Asian initiatives that seek to exclude the United States economically. For several years, Japan has shown ambivalence towards Malaysian Prime Minister Mahatir's proposal to form an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) that would exclude the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. They have

avoided giving a clear response to this plan that would give Japan a strong leadership position, despite their desires to become even more involved in the region's economic development.

The United States has made it clear that it opposes such groupings on the grounds that it could lead to an exclusive ASEAN trading bloc. In April 1995, Japan declined to attend an annual meeting of the ASEAN economic ministers (AEM) held in Phuket, Thailand. Knowing that the formation of the EAEC would be a main topic of discussion, it insisted that Australia and New Zealand be invited to attend before it agreed to participate in the meeting. [Ref. 124] The Malaysian press criticized Japan for "going all out to please the United States" which, according to it, has been an "overbearing" advocate of APEC. [Ref. 125] Another reason that Japan turned down this latest ASEAN invitation could have been that it did not want the 1995 APEC conference in Tokyo to be upstaged by any subregional economic developments. In response to Japan's refusal to participate in the AEM meeting, Prime Minister Mahatir snubbed a visiting Keidanren delegation led by its Chairman, Toyoda Shoichiro. Toyoda later said:

The United States and Asia are both important for Japan. I consider the EAEC concept a proposal within the APEC framework, and the EAEC and APEC have the same goal. [Ref. 126]

Suzuki Kazumasa, the Managing Director of Mitsui Corporation, is more emphatic in his support of Japan's involvement in the EAEC. According to him, "the entire ASEAN would

stand against Japan if Japan opposes the EAEC." [Ref. 126] Japanese business sees the EAEC as a wonderful opportunity to expand its penetration of regional markets.

Although the Japanese government still clearly wants to avoid the impression that it supports a Japan-led trading bloc, it is less reluctant to use ASEAN fora to exercise leadership on security issues. In preparation for the ARF meeting in Brunei on August 1, 1995, Japanese Foreign Minister Kono and his Philippine counterpart, Domingo Siazon, rallied support among East Asian nations for a concerted condemnation of France's plans to resume nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean. [Ref. 127]

During a visit to Tokyo by Vietnam's General Secretary Do Muoi, Japan not only extended \$800 million in aid to Vietnam, but it also announced its whole-hearted support of Vietnam's entry into ASEAN. [Ref. 128] This was Japan's message to China signaling its endorsement of ASEAN efforts to seek a peaceful resolution of the Spratly Island's dispute. It was also a clear demonstration of Japan's strategic interests in the area.

The Director of Japan's Defense Research Institute, Nishihara Masashi, gave an even more direct statement of Japan's concerns about China's intentions in the region. He was quoted by The International Herald Tribune in April 1995:

We are concerned about China's creeping irredentism and expansionism. The South China Sea is a very important trade route for us, not only with Southeast Asia, but with the Middle East and Europe. About 75 percent of Japan's oil imports pass through this sea, as does much inter-Asian trade. [Ref. 128]

The Chinese naval exercise and surface-to-surface missile firings scheduled to take place just north of Taiwan a week before the ASEAN meeting in Brunei in August 1995 served as a reminder of China's determination to defend its interests in the Spratlys, as well as its intention of enforcing its "one-China" policy.

Even though ASEAN states are most concerned about China's regional ambitions, many are still wary of Japan's future intentions. In a paper presented to a conference of the ASEAN Defense Technology Exchange in April 1995, Malaysian Undersecretary of Defense Abod predicted that Japan would soon develop "comprehensive military power, including nuclear capability." She went on to say that:

Geopolitics and Japan's past record of militarism and aggression suggest a Japan armed to the teeth will be a grave security threat to Southeast Asia. [Ref. 130]

In order to advance its current Asian policies, Japanese leaders have made efforts to express some form of apology for Imperial Japan's behavior during World War II. However, many Southeast Asians believe the comments of people like Okuno Seisuke, a former Minister of Justice, are more representative of Japan's true feelings. He said, "we fought the war on Asian territory but we never fought against Asians." [Ref. 121] In the near term, Japan's economic relationship with Southeast Asia will continue to be its primary avenue of influence in the region. It will have to open its markets to goods from Southeast Asia in order to redress its large trade surplus with the region. However, its massive direct investment in

ASEAN economies (over \$3 billion in 1992) will give it a large stake in the region's future.

[Ref. 13123]

E. THE RUSSIA FACTOR

Japan's relations with Russia have shown the least progress over the last five years when compared to its ties with its other Asian neighbors. The two countries have yet to conclude a peace treaty with each other that would officially end the hostilities that began in 1945. Improvement in their relations is blocked by the impasse over the Northern territories (Southern Kurils) dispute.

During Foreign Minister Kozyrev's visit to Tokyo in March of 1995, no progress was made in solving the territorial dispute over the four islands off the coast of Hokkaido. In fact, the Russians seemed to be reversing their policy of demilitarizing the islands. Reports from Moscow indicated that the Russians planned to increase the number of border guards stationed on the islands from current level of 4,000 to 10,000. [Ref. 132] When Foreign Minister Kono commented on this new development, Kozyrev replied that Moscow would send a group of experts to Tokyo in order to "explain the difficult aspects" of demilitarizing the disputed islands. [Ref. 133] The Nihon Kezai Shimbun identified an agreement to begin negotiations on fishing rights as the only beneficial result of the recent talks. [Ref. 134]

The Japanese believe that a resolution of the dispute in the near term is unlikely, given Yeltsin's waning political strength and the fractured nature of domestic politics in Russia. The Russian focus on its problems in Chechnya and the "near abroad," along with its domestic economic difficulties, put the Northern Territories issue low on Moscow's agenda.

A month before Kozyrev's visit to Tokyo, Prime Minister Murayama called on Russia to resolve the territorial dispute under the "principles of law and justice" as stipulated in the joint statement issued in October 1993 by then Prime Minister Hosokawa and President Yeltsin. [Ref. 135] Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo in the Fall of 1993 had produced some Japanese optimism regarding the dispute. The whole tone of his visit was upbeat with over sixteen bilateral documents being signed including joint statements on North Korea's nuclear weapon's program, Cambodia, nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and economic cooperation. [Ref. 136] Yeltsin also made a very explicit apology for the detention of 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia following World War II, and the subsequent death of 60,000 of them. [Ref. 137] (This televised address in which Yeltsin made a deep bow signifying Russia's remorse made a favorable impression on the NHK commentators.) The joint declaration issued on the final days of his visit included what Japan's Foreign Ministry considered to be significant progress on the territorial dispute. Russian agreement to abide by the 1956 Japan - Soviet Joint Declaration, which promised the immediate return of the two smaller islands (Habomai, and Shikotan) as soon as a peace treaty is signed between the two countries, was viewed as an important first step in resolving the issue. Because the declaration also promised to settle the dispute based on "historical and legal facts" and on the "principles of law and justice," the Japanese government believed a new framework had been established to end the dispute.

However, Yeltsin's own government was sending mixed signals on its willingness to resolve the territorial dispute. Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and Deputy Prime Minister

Shumeiko told leaders in the Russian Far East that the islands belonged to Russia and that their transfer to Japan was not on the agenda. [Ref. 72: p. 104] Following his strong showing in Russian parliamentary elections in December 1993, ultra-nationalist Vladimir Zhironovsky declared that there would be no ceding of Russian territory, and that there was no territorial dispute between Japan and Russia. [Ref. 138] The Speaker of the Duma, Ivan Rybkin proposed that the islands should remain Russian, and be turned into a special economic zone. [Ref. 78: p. 105] In April of 1995, Rybkin said that the dispute was not a bilateral one since it involved all the signatory nations of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. [Ref. 139] Japan gave up sovereignty to the Kuril Islands when it signed the treaty. However, the Japanese point out that Russia's predecessor, the Soviet Union, did not sign the treaty. Furthermore, it maintains that the four disputed islands are not part of the Kuril chain.

The Japanese government is no longer hopeful that economic incentives will cause Russia to compromise on the territorial dispute. During Kozyrev's trip to Tokyo in March 1995, neither Murayama or Kono seemed willing to discuss Kozyrev's proposals for Russo-Japanese cooperation on bilateral trade or other economic issues. Japan is now resigned to the fact that there will be no short term solution to the territorial issue. Yegor Gayder, the former First Deputy Premier and current leader of the liberal Democratic Choice Party, confirmed this view in April 1995 when he met with Foreign Minister Kono. He stated that there would be no positive moves in the near future regarding Russo-Japanese relations. [Ref. 140] The Russian parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1995 will prevent the

current Russian government from producing any bold initiatives vis-a-vis Japan in the next few months.

1. Russo-Japanese Security Cooperation

From January 31 until February 2, 1994, the first Trilateral Forum on North Pacific Security was held in Tokyo. Senior defense, and foreign affairs officials along with respected strategic analysts from academia and the private sector came from Japan, Russia, and the United States in order to discuss international security issues. Session one dealt with the problems involved in adjusting to the end of the Cold War, and included discussions on the changing nature of security, and regional military developments. The next session covered nuclear proliferation problems in Asia, and efforts to promote cooperative security ties. The final session that began on February 2, 1994, specifically addressed how to produce "mechanisms of cooperation" like improved bilateral ties, and the implementation of confidence-building measures. The forum marked the beginning of a real security dialogue between Japan and Russia.

In September of 1993, Japan sent a group of military experts to Moscow in order to discuss defense issues. This was the first time the two countries held bilateral consultations on such issues in the post-war period. [Ref. 141] The Director of the Defense Agency's Defense Research Institute, Hironaka Yuken, headed the delegation. The Japanese side presented a report entitled "The Framework of Regional Security," while Russian officials proposed confidence-building measures between the two countries. [Ref. 142]

In the Fall of 1994, the Russian and Japanese held their first combined naval exercise in the Sea of Japan. The exercise was a rescue-at-sea operation that involved several ships and aircraft from both countries. However, recurring maritime incidents between Russian coast guard vessels, and Japanese fishermen operating in the Northern Territories spoiled the cooperative atmosphere between the two countries. In August 1994, a Japanese fisherman was shot by a Russian patrol boat near the disputed Kuril Islands. This prompted a heated diplomatic exchange between the two countries. [Ref. 143] Following the incident, Japan's Maritime Safety Agency cooperated with the Russian coast guard in order to prevent Japanese fishing vessels from entering the disputed waters. In the past, Japan's government did little to discourage Japanese fishermen from entering the water off of the Southern Kurils. Some analysts believe that the Japanese government had previously given Japan's fishermen tacit approval to enter those waters in order to draw attention to Japanese claims. For several years Japanese fishermen have rendezvoused with Russian fishermen off of the Kuril Islands in order to buy the Russian catch directly. The Russian Far Eastern government frowns on this activity because it prevents their taxation of these exports.

During Yeltsin's visit in 1993, the two countries did sign an agreement to work together in stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Russians have been supportive of multilateral efforts to prevent the North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. However, Kozyrev's proposal that Russian reactor technology be provided to North Korea instead of a South Korean design in order to overcome an impasse in the

implementation of the Framework Agreement was rejected by the United States, Japan, and South Korea. [Ref. 144]

2. Other Bilateral Issues

The Russo-Japanese economic relationship has only seen minimal improvements in the last few years. Bilateral trade between the two countries only amounted to about \$2.4 billion in 1993 because of Russia's continuing economic difficulties, its lack of infrastructure and trade legislation, as well as its confusing administrative practices. [Ref. 78: p. 106]

In the Fall of 1993, the Japanese press reported on Russian dumping of radioactive waste in the Sea of Japan. Although the Japanese government had been aware that the Soviet Union had been engaged in this form of environmental pollution in East Asia for years, when video images of Russian ships dumping radioactive waste were played on Japanese television the government was forced to confront Russia on the matter. Japan has since constructed a liquid nuclear waste processing facility near Vladivostok in order to prevent future dumping.

Unofficial contact between the Japanese and Russian people has increased in recent years. Russian businessmen and tourists are frequently seen in Hokkaido port cities like Nemuro, as well as Tokyo. Former Japanese residents of the Southern Kurils have been allowed to visit their ancestors' graves (*hakamairi*) on the islands --- a significant familial duty for the Japanese. Local governments in Hokkaido have provided aid in the form of fuel and food to the Russian residents of the Kurils during the past several years.

However, many Japanese continue to view Russia as a threat to its security in the long term. Russian ballistic missile and cruise missile capable submarines continue to patrol the

Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk. Russian intelligence collection aircraft also routinely operate near Japan. On March 23, 1995, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a sharp protest over a Russian Mig-31's violation of Japanese airspace near Rebun Island off of Hokkaido. [Ref. 145] The Russians, like the Chinese, are worried about American plans to involve Japan in its TMD project.

In summary, the current prospects for drastically improved Russo-Japanese relations are dim.

V. LOOKING AHEAD

A. CURRENT STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES STRATEGY

Current American plans to defend its national security interests are based upon a document published by the Clinton Administration in July 1994. A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement articulates three central goals: maintain credible, battle-ready military forces, enhance America's economy, and promote democracy abroad. [Ref. 138]

The document reflects the difficulty the United States has had in coming to grips with the cornucopia of new, if less critical, security imperatives that followed the end of the Cold War. It recognizes that America's economic vitality is key to ensuring the continued strength of its military forces, and global influence. However, transnational issues like weapons proliferation, environmental degradation, rapid population growth in some countries, and ethnic conflict are listed as potentially serious threats to United States security that will require increased multilateral cooperation as well as United States leadership.

Despite the subtle emphasis on domestic economic security, the Strategy states that the United States must continue its robust deployment, and overseas stationing of American forces. These United States commitments are credited with the prevention of dangerous arms races, and the promotion of regional stability. In fact, the presence of United States forces overseas is seen as essential to the success of both bilateral and multilateral security initiatives,

and America's integration with critically important foreign markets. The Strategy still sees America as the world's primary provider of leadership in security affairs.

The United States federal budget deficit is named as a threat to America's competitiveness in world markets, and thus its economic security. Along with a reduction in this deficit, efforts at stronger government and business cooperation in R&D, and export promotion are prescribed. In order to improve the performance of United States business overseas, the United States will continue to expand the purview of multilateral trade arrangements like NAFTA and APEC. At the same time, it intends to pursue bilateral efforts at opening markets such as the United States - Japan Framework for Economic Partnership, and the recent agreements to open the Japanese car market to United States models.

Clinton's strategy includes a whole-hearted endorsement of democratic peace theory. The clearly stated, long-term goal of the United States is achieving a "world in which each of the major powers is democratic." The prescription given for attaining this objective is vague enough to allow policy makers some leeway in interpreting when this goal should have overriding importance. However, it does commit the United States to taking "immediate public positions" on the anti-democratic trends in some countries, rather than relying on quiet diplomacy to pressure such foreign governments to democratize. While the Strategy emphasizes that this policy is not a democratic crusade, its overseas promotion of "our best national values" undoubtedly will seem righteous to many Asian states.

In February of 1995, the United States spelled out its specific security goals for Asia in United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (EASR). [Ref. 147]

Largely the work of former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr., this publication is consistent with the objectives expressed in Clinton's Strategy. However, it reverses the United States plans for phased troop withdrawals from Asia that were announced in the Department of Defense's East Asian Security Initiative reports of 1990 and 1992. In the EASR the United States makes the commitment to maintain a "stable forward presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000 troops for the foreseeable future". The policy reversal was made in order to allow the United States to respond effectively to regional disputes, and global security contingencies. However, judging from the tenor of the report, maintaining the current United States force level is really meant to send a message of America's intention remain deeply engaged with its allies and friends in the region.

According to the EASR, the three pillars of America's security strategy in Asia are: its bilateral alliances (particularly with Japan, the ROK, and Australia), United States forward military presence, and participation in multilateral dialogues.

Out of all the alliances, the United States - Japan relationship is named as the "linchpin" of United States security policy in Asia. The United States believes that most of the region's other nations view the United States Japan security relationship as a major factor in ensuring regional stability. There are two assumptions that underlie this assessment. First, the United States forces in Japan are a deterrent against military adventurism by major powers in the region. Secondly, a strong United States - Japan military relationship precludes substantial Japanese rearmament, and the perceived threats that this possibility would pose to its neighbors. In an article in Foreign Affairs written in defense of the EASR, Nye

diplomatically handles what is essentially an argument for containing an emerging Japan. He states that Japanese security analysts who have looked at the prospects of Japan becoming a "normal country" with an independent military capability have determined that it would be enormously expensive "if Japan had to respond if its neighbors reacted (to Japan's rearmament) by building up their armaments." [Ref. 148] This line of reasoning does not square neatly with the concept of democratic peace, one of the main premises of Clinton's Strategy. That is to say, if one believes in the precepts of democratic peace theory, then a democratic country like Japan that is capable of defending itself should not appear threatening to its neighbors --- especially the ones with fledgling democracies like South Korea and Russia.

Another reason given by the EASR for strengthening the United States - Japan security relationship is that it allows the two countries to work together more closely on the achievement of mutual global objectives that are based on a common set of values. These objectives include humanitarian relief to the world's troubled spots, and support for emerging democracies. Finally, the United States sees the financial support provided by Japan's host nation support (which is about \$5 billion per year), its purchases of large amounts of United States military equipment, and the potential transfers of Japanese dual-use technology as supporting United States global strategy. The JSDF's ability to defend important sea lanes, limited though it may be, is also viewed as an asset that contributes to regional security.

The rationale given for the continued forward presence of the United States military in Asia is based on several considerations. This practice supports the U.S.'s ability to respond

to distant crises quickly, deters regional aggressors, and enhances American ability to influence other important issues in Asia. Regarding this last point, Nye argues that there are incalculable benefits that accrue to the United States from being militarily engaged in the region. Such a presence gives the United States a say on other non-military issues that affect its interests --- particularly economic concerns. Nye cites the reluctance of many Asian countries to join an EAEC that excluded the United States as evidence of Asian concerns about losing continued American security guarantees. [Ref. 148: p. 100] Japanese concerns about the impact of United States - Japan trade disputes on the security relationship and on United States military presence there have been credited with their capitulation to some American demands regarding trade.

The participation of the United States in multilateral security dialogues, the third pillar of the EASR, is considered to be a supplement to the bilateral alliance system; and a means to promote confidence-building measures, and transparency in the military intentions of regional powers. The United States views the weakness of multilateral institutions in East Asia as a factor that supports the argument for assertive American leadership in the Asia-Pacific region.

In order to accomplish the "enlargement" of Clinton's Strategy, the EASR, makes it clear that America intends to expand its bilateral security dialogue with its former enemies --- China, Russia, and Vietnam. China is the focus of much of America's strategic calculations for the future of East Asia. In a paper submitted to a conference that was co-sponsored by the Japan Institute of International Affairs, and the Pacific forum CSIS, Nye outlined the

United States strategy of comprehensive engagement with China that is designed to achieve "mutual understanding as well as greater transparency and trust." [Ref. 149: p. 7]

The United States does not currently consider China as an adversary, but the steady growth of its military power and influence must be taken into account. In an interview conducted by the Los Angeles Times, Mr. Nye said:

If you treat China as an enemy China will become an enemy. If you have a policy of containment toward China now you've written off the chance [that China won't become an enemy]. It may be a 50-50 chance, so why write off the 50% . [Ref. 150]

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, General James Clapper, listed North Korea's military posture, and future military developments in China as the DOD's primary security concerns in Asia when he gave his assessment of worldwide threats to the Senate Armed Services Committee in January 1995. [Ref. 151] The EASR points to the successful implementation of the Framework Agreement with North Korea as being part of a process that will ease tensions over the nuclear issue. Again, the continued presence of United States troops in South Korea is viewed as an insurance policy that promotes a peaceful resolution of tensions on the peninsula.

In summary, in the view of the current Administration, the ending of the Cold War has left the United States as the only global power capable of ensuring the continued stability of the East Asian security environment. United States responsibilities in the region have only increased.

B. CURRENT STATEMENT OF JAPANESE STRATEGY

For several years now Japan has been edging towards a more independent role in the management of its security affairs. The events of the Gulf War along with a scaled back United States military presence in Asia were a kind of wake-up call for Japanese leaders to think more seriously about their external security.

It was the debate within Japan caused by its need to respond to the Gulf crisis that really enlivened Japanese thinking about its place in the world. Some argued that Japan should remain aloof from such conflicts and continue to rely on "check book" diplomacy. Others argued that Japan should accept more of the burden of maintaining international security; but they often disagreed on whether this should include the dispatch of JSDF forces in either a supporting or peacekeeping role.

In order to pave the way for Japanese participation in future peacekeeping efforts, Prime Minister Kaifu's government introduced legislation in 1991 that would permit up to two thousand JSDF members to be sent abroad for U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping missions. However, it was not until the Summer of 1992 after tortuous debate in the Diet (and attempts by opposition party members to slow the voting process by performing the "ox walk" as they shuffled to the ballot box) that a new prime minister, Miyazawa, was able to gain passage of the Peacekeeping Operations Bill. Shortly thereafter Japan sent a 600-man contingent from the JSDF to participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations on Cambodia. To date, JSDF forces have been involved in U.N. operations in Mozambique, Rwanda, and Zaire.

In February of 1992 a "Special Study Group on Japan's Role in the International Community" chaired by former LDP Secretary General Ozawa issued a draft report. The report listed four principles for Japan's new international role:

1. Maintain close ties with the U.S.
2. Help to strengthen the leadership role of the G-7.
3. Actively take part in U.N. security functions.
4. Actively confer with other Asian countries in order to preserve peace and maintain stability in the region. [Ref. 152]

The draft report also recommended that the interpretation of the Japanese Constitution be reconsidered so that Japan could pursue an active pacifism that would allow it to use force in helping to maintain or restore international peace. [Ref. 152: pp. 53-54]

As can be seen from the draft report, Japanese leaders were careful to fit their plans for a more activist foreign policy within the context of multilateral bodies like the U.N. and G-7, as well as increased bilateral cooperation with their Asian neighbors. It became increasingly apparent that Japan's bilateral ties with the United States were less important in their own right, but continued to be relevant as a badge of representing Japan's commitment to international stability as it expanded its political influence in Asia.

The Defense Agency's White Paper for 1993 stressed the importance of establishing a dialogue among Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the Southeast Asian nations. It cited the February 1993 visit of a Russian military delegation to Tokyo as the kind of direct dialogue that promotes peace and stability in the region. [Ref. 153]

The debate within Japan on whether the Constitution needed to be amended heated up in 1993. Some analysts argued that a reinterpretation was all that was necessary. They asserted that an amendment made in 1946 by Ashida Hitoshi to the war-renouncing Article IX of the original draft prepared by MacArthur's staff gave policy makers some leeway. In their way of thinking, Article IX could be interpreted to mean that Japan renounced war as a sovereign right in the settlement of its disputes with other countries, but not in defending itself against an invader, or in cooperation with U.N. peacekeeping efforts. [Ref. 154] Meanwhile, public support for amending the Constitution also seemed to be climbing. A poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shinbun found that 50 percent of Japanese supported amending the Constitution, and 33 percent were opposed in 1993 --- compared with 33 percent in favor, and 51 percent opposed in 1991. [Ref. 155] In December of 1993 the Director of the Defense Agency, Nakanishi Keisuke, was forced to resign when he advocated a constitutional amendment that would allow the JSDF to play a more active role in U.N. sponsored peacekeeping operations. Nakanishi, an ally of Ozawa and a longtime advocate of giving Japanese peacekeepers combatant duties, said "it is no good to stick to the Constitution, which was drafted fifty years ago." [Ref. 156]

During 1994 Japan continued to indicate its willingness to play a more active role in international security affairs, and in shaping a new world order. It stepped up its diplomatic drive to get a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. It continued trying to reassure neighboring countries of its remorse about the past, and of its peaceful intentions.

The defense posture of Japan exhibited the signs of a long overdue change. The Defense Agency's White Paper for 1994 devoted much less space to the analysis of the Russian military. [Ref. 157] Instead, it concentrated on the threats of nuclear proliferation in the region posed by North Korea. [Ref. 157: pp. 36-42] The Far Eastern Economic Review quoted a Western diplomat who said that "it means the Cold War is over at defense headquarters and the new realities of regional instability are starting to percolate." [Ref. 158] This new outlook had been advocated by Maritime Self Defense Force leaders, who, like their Imperial Navy predecessors, are generally more attuned to the international security climate than their counterparts in the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF). (The GSDF had opposed a shift of attention away from the Russian threat because it would mean a reduction in their allotted troop strength).

In February of 1994, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro appointed a special advisory panel to review Japan's long-term defense policy. The panel was made up of senior representatives from the business world (the Chairman of the panel was the director of the Asahi Breweries, Ltd., Mr. Higuchi Hitaro, who is also head of a family long associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA]), retired officials from the Defense Agency and MOFA, as well as experts in strategic affairs from Japanese academe. [Ref. 159] The conclusions reached by the Higuchi Commission will play a large part in the restructuring of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO). For the past two decades the NDPO has provided the basis for Japan's defense planning, and as a result, it has had a great impact on the United States - Japan security relationship. The 1976 NDPO conceptualized a

standard Japanese defense force that would be capable of dealing with limited or small-scale aggression [Ref. 160]. It was written in a period of detente between the major powers would continue to produce stability. However, the document was flexible enough to allow defense planners some latitude in interpreting it as a basis for military procurement. [Ref. 160: p. 21]

The Higuchi Commission issued its report, The Modality of Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century, in August 1994. Their report noted that with the Cold War over and the superpower's influence diminished, power relationships have become much more fluid in Asia. Therefore, it gave pride of place to Japan's need to expand its efforts at multilateral cooperation. Secondly, it recognized the need to maintain the bilateral defense relationship with the United States as a means to make multilateral cooperation more effective. Finally, the report emphasized the need to improve Japan's indigenous defensive capability:

The ultimate foundation of security lies in the determination of a people to defend themselves and in holding the appropriate means of doing so...Self-defense capability is a concrete expression of a nation's capability of self management and of crisis management. [Ref. 159: p. 35]

The need to improve the government's ability to respond to crises effectively was named as the primary security priority. While Japan has a National Security Council (consisting of the prime minister, the Ministers of foreign affairs and finance, the chief cabinet secretary, the chairman of the National Public Safety Commission, and directors general of the Defense Agency and the Economic Planning Agency) it has been a ritualistic conference designed to give authority to conclusions reached in advance by the separate ministries. It cannot deal with emergencies on its own. To illustrate the point, the Security Council did not

meet until hostilities actually began between the Coalition Forces and Iraq during the Gulf War. [Ref. 161]

The Higuchi Commission's emphasis on a multilateral agenda is intended to take advantage of what it views as an historic opportunity to expand arms control efforts, and support the security dialogues already underway in ARF and the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific. Patrick Cronin views the slant towards multilateralism as Japan's way of hedging against waning United States commitments to the mutual defense relationship, and as a way for Japan to channel its political and financial resources away from bilateral defense cooperation. [Ref. 159: p. 9]

And yet, the report asserts that international cooperation centered on the United States and augmented by NATO in Europe, and the United States - Japan Security Treaty in Asia provide the framework for the post-Cold War security system.

In order to improve the United States - Japan security relationship the commission recommends that interoperability between the two militaries be improved in the areas of operations and intelligence. In order to provide better mutual logistic support, it specifically advocates the establishment of an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) between the two countries like the one between the United States and NATO members.

The commission wants to reshape the JSDF to meet the threats of the future. This will require a reorientation away from old, Cold War force structures. In their view the most likely dangers to Japan's security in the current international environment are weapons proliferation, and localized military conflicts that will often be induced by economic poverty

and social discontent. Therefore, Japan should be prepared to respond to crises with the appropriate measures --- be it economic aid or peacekeeping forces.

The measures they recommend for reshaping the JSDF for the 21st century will make it more effective for peacekeeping, and disaster relief missions, but will also make it more self-reliant in providing for the defense of Japan against armed attack. This is a summary of their recommendations:

1. Augmented intelligence collection and analysis capabilities, along with improved early warning and surveillance systems;
2. Strengthened joint operational capability among the three services;
3. Improved maneuverability and combat readiness;
4. A reduction in the authorized force levels from the present level of about 274,000 to about 240,000 (which is close to the current manning levels of the services);
5. Develop systems that can deal with ballistic missiles (TMD);
6. Maintain the United States nuclear umbrella over Japan;
7. Maintain defense technology at an advanced level; and
8. Maintain autonomy and independence in equipment procurement and defense-related technology. [Ref. 159: pp. 48-55]

With an executive adviser to *Keidanren* (the Federation of Economic Organizations) on the commission the plight of Japan's defense industry was not ignored. In some areas, Japanese defense procurement is about half of what it was in the late 1980s. [Ref. 162] The commission realizes that the government needs to maintain domestic production in arms if it

wants to become a more self-sufficient nation. They believe that joint research and development should be conducted with the United States and *other* nations.

Finally, its recommendations for an improved intelligence capability suggests an expansion in governmental collection efforts -- both technical and human. Japan's space program has already developed a launch vehicle that could place intelligence satellites into orbit. More importantly, the need to make Japan's intelligence bureaucracy more responsive to political leaders is required. Some efforts have been made on this front since the Gulf War, but bureaucratic inefficiencies still exist.

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kono Yohei, outlined Japan's intentions to become more proactive in international security affairs during a speech given to the U.N. General Assembly in September 1994. [Ref. 163] He stressed Japan's commitment to increase its contribution to U.N. efforts to solve global economic and social problems. Like the Highuchi Commission, he identified weapons proliferation, and subregional conflicts as the greatest dangers to world security; and reiterated Japan's decision to become more involved in PKO missions. Finally, he urged the U.N. to grant Japan a seat on the U.N. Security Council as soon as possible, and to delete the so-called "former enemy clauses" from the U.N. Charter. [Ref. 163]

In his speech to the 132nd session of the Diet in January 1995, Prime Minister Murayama echoed the recent calls of other Japanese politicians when he expressed Japan's need to intensify its economic and political contacts with other nations in the region. He stressed the importance of expanding Japan's involvement in multilateral fora like ARF and

APEC. [Ref. 164] Only after describing the importance of enhancing Japan's inter-Asian ties did he mention the bilateral relationship with the United States.

Japan clearly believes its future economic and political success will depend more on its ability to encourage development and peace in Asia. It is also trying to move its global foreign policy from a United States - centered basis to one that revolves around a more powerful U.N. Japan's determination to become more self-reliant militarily is also an indication of its doubts about the U.S.'s ability to retain its current level of influence in the region.

C. RANGE OF ALTERNATIVES

The arguments being made in support of strengthening or maintaining the current nature of the U.S.- Japan Security relationship are based upon United States policy goals that seek to ensure American leadership in world political affairs, and Japanese security objectives that seek to avoid the expense of increased defense spending, and perceptions that Japan may pose a military threat to their neighbors. Advocates of the Mutual Security Treaty as it currently configured are loathe to change a bilateral regime that has served the interests of both countries so well over the last four decades. They view the current international arena as being fraught with uncertainty, and full of potentially destabilizing threats. Nascent multilateral security fora in Asia are, in their view, not able to meet the challenge of quickly and decisively handling crisis that may erupt in the region. They maintain that only the close cooperation forged in a tight United States - Japan bilateral security relationship can provide the means to contain and prevent regional crises.

In a paper written for the United States Naval War College, Janvier Smith asserts that the United States - Japan security relationship is "strong and will continue to remain so." [Ref. 165] She argues that the U.S.'s forward basing of military forces is necessary to support its global strategy, and to aid other regional powers that have endorsed continued military presence in Asia. These are the two main rationales for maintaining the bilateral relationship in its current form. She describes the United States as the region's only "honest broker" that can act as a go-between in solving inter-Asian disputes. [Ref. 165]

In January 1995, at a conference of Japanese and American security analysts chaired by Sato Seizaburo, and Jerome Kahan concluded that the United States - Japan alliance should be enhanced as the basis for regional stability. [Ref. 166] America was urged to send a clear message about its willingness to maintain its current level of military engagement in the area, and it recommended that Japan have expanded rights and responsibilities in the maintenance of regional security. [Ref. 166: pp. 22-39] Multilateral security dialogues were viewed by the group as a promising means to promote peace in the region, and as an opportunity for Japan to become more active in regional affairs. However, the participants did agree that collective security regimes for the Asia-Pacific were currently unworkable. [Ref. 166: pp. 22-39]

Underlying these arguments is a basic distrust of Japan's ability to act responsibly and competently in managing its own security affairs without direct United States guidance. Another major concern stated by both Japanese and American policy makers who support the status quo in their bilateral relations is what might happen in the region, and within Japan if

the nuclear umbrella were withdrawn from Japan. The assumption is that the continued presence of United States troops in Japan provides a permanent solution to both perceived problems.

In his book Blueprint for a New Japan, Ozawa Ichiro also reaffirms the continued relevance of the United States - Japan security relationship [Ref. 167]. However, his approach is more forward looking than the two previous examples. He supports continued security cooperation with the United States as long as its policies are laying the groundwork for a U.N.-centered world order. Ozawa believes that Japan must play an activist role in world security matters: "we must make the leap from our passive 'exclusive defense strategy' to a dynamic 'peace building strategy.' " [Ref. 167: p. 107] He advocates a restructuring of the JSDF away from its Cold War roles as a subordinate part of United States military strategy to an organization with the training and equipment necessary to conduct both military and non-military peace-building missions. [Ref. 167: p. 108]

Ozawa's vision of a new "normal" Japan is one that its neighbors will no longer fear, and one that will be far more responsible for its own defense. He deals with the issue regarding Japan's need for a nuclear umbrella by proposing a U.N.-controlled strategic force to deter attacks on non-nuclear states.

Those analysts and politicians who advocate a loosening or substantial modification of security ties between the United States and Japan point to apparent trends toward increased regional economic interdependence, reduced military tensions between former adversaries, the need for Japan to conduct its affairs more independently of the United States,

and America's relative economic decline as evidence of the need for change. They tend to be more optimistic about the multilateral opportunities to solve the security problems that threaten to cause conflict in Asia.

Domestic attitudes within both countries towards the security relationship have reflected the need for modification of its parameters. Americans have been less hesitant to link economic and traditional security issues. In the latest round of trade negotiations on car imports, Winston Lord and White House spokesman Mike McCurry made oblique references to withdrawing the nuclear umbrella from Japan if the Japanese refused to make concessions on opening its car market. [Ref. 168]

While the Japanese share many of the same values that Americans stand for -- such as freedom, democracy, and liberal market economies -- they often do not agree with the United States on where these values should lead their country in international affairs. [Ref. 89] They believe that their contributions to global security in the form of ODA, host nation support, and their financial support for the Gulf War effort have been unappreciated. While they understand the need for Japan to play a more activist role in world affairs they resent being pressured by the United States to follow its lead.

Ishihara Shintaro supports a change in the qualitative and quantitative level of security cooperation with the United States. He advocates a drastic reduction in the United States military presence in Japan, and a return to Japanese control of some of the more important United States military bases near crowded Tokyo (e.g., Yokota Air Base). [Ref. 169] He wants to base the security relationship on a more equal and looser footing. Self-defense

forces would no longer be a component of the United States strategy, but a balanced, non-threatening force capable of defending Japan, and being actively engaged in PKO missions. [Ref. 169] Ishihara would reduce the apprehensions of neighboring countries regarding Japan's intentions by ensuring complete transparency of Japan's military capabilities, and by demonstrating Japan's will to support peacekeeping efforts. [Ref. 169]

As part of a change in the security relationship, he advocates closer economic and political ties with Japan's Asian neighbors. Japan's involvement in the EAEC is seen as a way to encourage development in the region, and to promote worldwide trade. [Ref. 169]

Ishihara believes that the uncertainty of future threats can be handled on more of an ad hoc basis with the United States, and other powers, rather than by strengthening ties with the United States before such problems arise. [Ref. 169] If China proves to have hegemonic aims can then cooperate to balance such a threat.

Edward Olsen and David Winterford argue that the diversification of power in Asia (and the rest of the world) will probably force the United States and Japan to choose some variant of multilateralism in order to manage regional conflicts. So that rising powers might be steered into a framework of shared leadership that maximizes American leverage on security issues, the United States should seek to promote the multilateral fora it prefers now. Olsen and Winterford propose a Pax Condominia

in which nominally co-equal countries and regional clusters of countries would loosely share access, costs, risks, and responsibility for maintaining a semblance of world order, and resolving breakdowns as they occur. [Ref. 170: p. 39 - 40]

They warn that if America tries too hard to remake Asia in its own image based on United States interpretations of human rights and democracy, Asian powers may use multilateral structures to contain American ambitions. [Ref. 170: p. 36-37]

Other analysts are more direct in their criticism of the anachronistic structures in the United States - Japan relationship. Americans are reluctant to give up the appurtenances of power that they enjoyed during the Cold War despite the dangers posed to their long-term economic security if old commitments are not reevaluated. The Japanese who are just beginning to come to terms with the prospects of exercising their substantial power on the world stage are relatively content to let America guarantee its external security for now.

Chalmers Johnson thinks that the United States and Japan need to reestablish their relationship based on their economic interdependence, while at the same time recognizing their different political and ideological agendas. [Ref. 171: p. 322] He believes that continuing on the course laid down when the Mutual Security Treaty was negotiated will inevitably produce a serious clash of interests between the two countries.

The Japanese do not share the same ideological view of the new world order as held by many Americans. Their interests will lead them to different conclusions about the need to become involved in particular foreign conflicts. They will increasingly resent being subsumed in the policies of what they view as a declining hegemon. Johnson makes a similar point when he says:

Japan has never been drawn to alliances with nations in decline. The Americans would therefore be wise to abandon the term "burden sharing," because it both reeks of American self-righteousness and amounts to a self-

advertisement of America's declining ability to carry out an independent foreign policy. [Ref. 171: p. 307]

These two broadly defined schools of thought on the future course of the United States - Japan security relationship acknowledge to varying degrees the change that has taken place in world politics since the late 1980s. And yet, the strategy of continuing or strengthening bilateral ties forged under radically different circumstances is intended to harness the political and economic power of an emerging Japan in the service of United States global objectives. Japanese who support the security relationship in its present form see it as an opportunity to stay focused on domestic economic security concerns. This approach ignores many of the economic and political trends within both countries that will make such an integration of their respective policy goals incompatible. Americans demand increased financial and technological support from Japan in order to continue its leadership in international political and military affairs. It will be far more difficult for any Japanese government to maintain, let alone increase, the level of host nation support, or transfers of dual-use technology to the United States in this era of increasing economic rivalry and declining military tensions.

Both nations will sometimes want to conduct their affairs in Asia out of the context of their bilateral security relationship. Allowing both nations a freer hand in determining their national interests will lead to more meaningful cooperation where those interests converge, as well as a more straightforward approach to perceived conflicts of interest in the bilateral relationship.

A loosening of security ties between the United States and Japan does pose risks as well as opportunities. Japan may opt for substantial rearmament, and may even acquire nuclear weapons but it will probably do so as a result of clear and ominous external threats. The "nuclear allergy" and the anti-militarism among the modern Japanese electorate precludes a unilaterally aggressive Japan. As the Japanese begin to independently face the challenges to their interests abroad, they will develop more effective bureaucratic and political mechanisms for responding to crises. at the same time, Japanese politicians will be forced to develop the national consensus on what constitutes Japan's vital interests. Since Japan continued to greatly benefit from the international trade regime, and supports U.N. efforts to keep the peace it will have a lot in common with the fundamental United States policy objectives.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION

The problems with deepening the level of security cooperation between the United States and Japan are manifest. The 1996 United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security fails to address many of these problems. Even when a clear, common threat served as the basis for their coordinated efforts during the Cold War the Japanese did not view their security relationship with the United States as a full fledged alliance. During that period, Japanese policy makers were careful to avoid any increased military commitment, or foreign policy alignment with the United States that was not absolutely essential to the maintenance of the relationship. Therefore it was not until the early 1980s that any substantial combined United States - Japan military exercises were conducted. On the foreign policy front they also took an independent stance when their interests dictated it. For example, since the 1970s Japan has pursued an independent foreign policy in the Middle East. The latest example of the divergent objectives that the two countries have in that region was demonstrated in June 1995 when Japan refused to go along with a United States trade embargo against Iran for its attempts to acquire nuclear technology, and its sponsorship of international terrorism.

The crisis precipitated by North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT tested the vitality and relevance of the security relationship in post - Cold War Asia. When the United States began considering the imposition of economic sanctions against North Korea it found the Japanese reluctant to agree with such an approach. As tensions mounted over the issue

in late 1993, and early 1994 the United States government began to seek clarification of the kind of support it could expect from Japan if U.N.-sponsored sanctions were imposed, and/or some type of military engagement resulted with North Korea. The Japanese government was hesitant to give any formal commitments in advance regarding the kind of support it would offer in the various contingencies. They preferred to wait until sanctions were declared, or hostilities commenced before they announced their intentions. It remained unclear throughout the crisis as to what extent the Japanese would allow the United States to use its bases in Japan to carry out its policies vis-a-vis North Korea. What role the JSDF would play in the case of sanctions against North Korea, or in the case of North Korean attack against United States ships was undetermined. However, it was clear that without Japanese cooperation any economic sanctions against North Korea would be ineffective. With Korean residents in Japan sending between \$1 and \$2 billion to North Korea every year Japan is an important source of hard currency for Kim Jong-Il's government. [Ref. 172]

While Japan's commitment to provide funding in support of the Framework Agreement between the United States and North Korea did help to secure that deal, there was not the kind of planning, and coordination of policies that one might expect from two countries that have had a formal security relationship for nearly half a century. If the United States and Japan could not easily establish consensus, and plans of action on how to face a perennial foe, one wonders how the two countries would cooperate if a crisis arose from an unexpected part of the region. One of the arguments repeatedly made in support of maintaining the United States - Japan security relationship as it currently configured is that

it provides the mechanism for responding quickly and concertedly to regional crisis. Ironically, an arrangement that would give United States forces access to Japanese bases in certain contingencies instead of permanent basing rights may have produced an even more coordinated United States - Japan response to the North Korean nuclear issue. One of the problems faced by Japanese policy makers was the negative domestic reaction they feared if the United States bases in Japan had been used by America for unilateral sanctions enforcement, or military strikes against North Korea. If Japanese leaders had been able to say the United States military would be given access to Japanese bases in order to enforce sanctions, it would have been a means of stepping up the pressure on North Korea short of actually applying those sanctions. At the same time, the Japanese government would be able to demonstrate to its wary public that it would have some positive control over the parameters of United States military action originating from Japanese bases.

Another American motive for establishing closer defense cooperation with Japan is their desire to gain access to Japanese technology. One of the objectives that the United States government had when it pressured Japan into a co-production arrangement of their newest fighter aircraft, FS-X, was that some Japanese technology would flow back to the United States. In fact, Congress placed some restrictions on transfers of American aerospace technology to Japanese manufacturers, while at the same time, insisting that Japanese technology flow back to the United States under the co-production agreement. [Ref. 173] When the prototype of the FS-X was first introduced in January 1995 the project was already two years behind schedule, and cost overruns were twice as high as the original projections.

[Ref. 174] The value of Japanese technology that United States corporations were offered was of questionable value. Some experts believe that American producers are already ahead in the two most notable areas in which Japanese technology was transferred --- composites, and phased array radar technology.

As a result of the FS-X co-production project, and the previous United States - Japan joint production and licensed production projects that included the F-15 and the Boeing-777, the Japanese aerospace industry is closer to achieving self-sufficiency in aircraft production.

[Ref. 87: pp. 158-161] Even with the restrictions placed on the transfer of United States technology during the development phase of the FS-X, Japanese firms were able to learn about Lockheed's computer-aided design methods, as well as other production techniques.

[Ref. 173]

Since the small Japanese defense industry is likely to continue to suffer as orders for weapons systems decline, it seems unlikely that Japan's government will again be coerced into allotting a substantial share of production to a foreign producer as occurred in the FS-X case. In fact, the cost overruns and technical difficulties that may end up producing a fighter that costs about \$100 million a copy (compared to \$25-30 million for a comparable United States fighter) could be blamed on the United States government by those in Japan who support indigenous production of weaponry. Originally, MITI and the Defense Agency were pushing for a domestically produced fighter. Now that Japan's aerospace industry is more capable, and the results of the FS-X project have been so problematic, many of the arguments against domestic production of such weaponry have been negated.

While there are incentives for the Japanese government to seek United States cooperation in producing other weapon systems like ballistic missile defense systems, it may be difficult for them to produce the technology transfers necessary to induce United States cooperation. The United States wants access to dual-use technologies like liquid-crystal displays that are mostly controlled by private industry. Japanese government officials often point out that they can not simply tell companies to make these technologies available to United States producers. [Ref. 162] As economic competition between the two countries becomes an even more important aspect of their relationship, the prospects for close cooperation in the production of high-technology weapons will decrease.

For several years the United States has been soliciting Japanese support for the production of theater ballistic missile defense systems (TMD). On March 17, 1995, United States contractors and defense officials and Defense Department officials held a display of one of the TMD system prototypes at Yokota Air Force Base for Japanese government officials, and defense industry representatives. Despite attempts by United States government representatives to tone down the hard-sell tactics that have characterized previous United States overtures to gain Japanese participation in the program, United States contractors turned the event into a glitzy sales campaign. [Ref. 175] The clear message the United States has been sending to Japan is "we want your *yen* and your technology." Even though Japan acknowledges the number one military threat it faces is ballistic missile attack from North Korea it has been slow in becoming involved in U.S.-sponsored TMD programs. Many United States military, and civilian officials expect Japan to eventually support TMD

initiatives. However, it is apparent that Japan will only do so after carefully considering the needs of its own defense industry, and the perceptions that its acquisition of such systems will create in neighboring countries.

Another trend that analysts of the United States - Japan security relationship must fully appreciate is the declining willingness of politicians on both sides of the Pacific to fund the costs of maintaining the current level of bilateral military cooperation. United States requests for more Japanese financial support for the repair costs of warships, and other expenses were rebuffed in March of 1995. [Ref. 176] Other Japanese politicians have hinted that even the current levels of host-nation support need to be reduced. The Japanese press has noted the relatively affluent living standards enjoyed by American servicemen in Japan; and the fact that Japan's government heavily subsidizes their accommodations. In an interview with the current Director of the Defense Agency, Tamazawa Tokuichiro, political commentator Imai Hisao pointed out the modest living conditions of JSDF personnel, and asked why "poor Japan has to squeeze out a 'sympathy budget' for the benefit of Americans (in Japan), who are living like rich men?" [Ref. 177]

Pressure to return United States bases and facilities to Japanese control (or shared control) has increased year after year. Although the agreement to return Futenma air base in Okinawa to Japanese control will help. Japanese citizens will continue to call for the return of American bases in the crowded Kanto plain. Furthermore, the uses of the bases still in control of the United States military face mounting restrictions, and limitations. Over the years the Japanese government has been content to take the long-term view in its drive to

regain control of many of the bases. In some cases its bureaucrats have simply outlasted or outwitted many American officials in Japan who serve three or four year assignments in the administration of United States bases there. The dispute about United States live-fire exercises over Okinawa's "Highway" No. 104 is illustrative of this phenomenon. Originally the Japanese asked to pave a dirt road through a United States firing range so that it could be used when gunnery exercises were not being conducted. Once the road was paved, the Japanese government requested that the United States suspend its live-fire exercises over this new highway --- thereby ending the utility of the firing range.

Requests to open up Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, and Yokota Air Base near Tokyo to civilian use are continually made by Japanese businessmen, and politicians. Opening these facilities to commercial air freight would ease the congestion at Japan's crowded air hubs, and bring business into these areas. These requests from commercial interest groups, along with the complaints about noise levels, and other hazards are getting a more sympathetic reception from bureaucrats and politicians in Tokyo.

Other events of 1995 revealed less tangible but important demonstrations of the weaknesses in the United States - Japan security relationship. After the Kobe earthquake in February the Japanese government exhibited reluctance in accepting American offers of assistance, despite the desperate need of survivors. Rescue dogs made available by United States military commanders were refused. [Ref. 178] Some offers to ship medical personnel and supplies were also declined. Eventually tens of thousands of blankets, hundreds of tents and beds, and other essentials were eventually airlifted into the area by the United States

military in Japan. One of the leading newspapers in Japan interpreted these United States relief efforts as being driven by a United States desire to prove the continued relevance of the United States - Japan security relationship. The *Mainichi Shimbun* quoted an official from Japan's Defense Agency who said:

United States Forces Japan (USFJ) came out strong in explaining what they could do after the quake occurred. I think that they wanted to publicize their power. [Ref. 179]

In March 1995, Japan experienced an act of domestic terrorism that shook the country's psyche as much as the *Hanshin* earthquake did during the previous month. A nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway killed ten people and left five thousand injured. A spokesman for the *Aum Shin Ri Kyo* cult that is suspected of carrying out the attack said that he believed the United States military had masterminded the crime. [Ref. 180] The cult leader also claimed that he and his followers had been attacked by more than ten United States military planes that were spraying nerve gas. [Ref. 180] The Japanese government never issued a statement denying these claims by the cult. Senior United States military and civilian officials in Japan think that the Japanese government should have echoed the denials of the cult's claims made by United States Embassy and USFJ spokesmen.

Since 1995 also happened to be the 50th anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, there were plenty of occasions that reminded both countries of the bitterness of the struggle that predated their security relationship. Over the years officials in both countries have preferred to avoid directly addressing issues like war guilt, and the morality of dropping the

atomic bombs. As a result, unlike events marking the end of the war in Europe, both Japan and the United States preferred muted commemorations of their important battles in the Pacific. For example, Japanese officials insisted upon knowing beforehand the character of United States plans to commemorate the battle of Iwo Jima. They wanted to know whether the United States planned to "mourn the war dead or commemorate the victory" before they approved the ceremony on the island. [Ref. 181]

Japanese reaction to America's Enola Gay exhibition at the Smithsonian was particularly harsh. Funabashi Yoichi, the Washington correspondent of the *Asahi Shimbun*, declared that the atomic bomb is viewed in America as "holy relic," something that United States politicians dare not criticize. Prime Minister Murayama called the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki atrocities when he voiced his criticism of the exhibit. [Ref. 183]

The inability to establish a mutual understanding about these issues along with more routine failures to reach agreements on port visits for United States warships, certain aspects of military base usage, and efforts to expand some areas of intelligence sharing are indications of more fundamental problems in the relationship.

B. REAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

Thirty-five years have passed since the last revision of the United States - Japan Security Treaty. Many officials in both countries have become accustomed to viewing the international community through the prism of their bilateral relations with each other. As a result they have overlooked or downplayed the social, economic, and political pressures within their respective countries that will lead to a modification of the United States - Japan

security relationship. Needless to say, the international security environment has drastically changed since 1960. It is true that the profound changes that have occurred in the relations between Asian states does not mean that the region is completely stable. However, the need for the current level of United States military presence in Asia must be seriously reappraised.

The primary threat to instability in Northeast Asia is still posed by North Korea. However, without the military and political support of Russia or China its is highly unlikely that it will invade a better armed, and more populous South Korea that can count on United States logistical, and military support. The question is whether the United States needs to station tens of thousands of United States troops in South Korea or Japan to deter an ever weaker North Korea. Does it need to maintain ninety-four bases on 78,500 acres of land [Ref. 184] in a densely populated country like Japan? Base access agreements, and periodic deployments of United States troops, ships, and aircraft to the region could send the same message of American commitment to the ultimate defense of South Korea and Japan's territorial integrity. Both Japan and South Korea are capable of mustering the troop strength required to defend their lands against the threats that they currently face. American support should clearly focus on its ability to weigh in with naval and air power, and to provide supplies of all sorts should the need arise. The inherent flexibility of naval, and air forces gives the United States the option of deploying these forces rapidly when they are required.

Drastically reducing the number of American personnel stationed in Northeast Asia would solve a number of the bilateral issues complicating relations with Japan and South Korea. It would also be consistent with United States vital interests in the region. The

settlement of base-related problems, and issues regarding the SOFA status of United States troops in South Korea and Japan would ease much of the domestic political pressure in those countries to revise their relationship with the United States. Furthermore, given the current level of United States troops in those countries America is in danger of becoming involved in international and internal disputes that do not affect its interests. For the past two centuries, America's overriding interest in Asia has been preventing the domination of the region by a hegemonic power, and assuring its commercial access to and through the area. It has not been especially concerned about what country exercises sovereignty over certain groups of islands, or other bits of territory. Because of the perceived political leverage that a substantial United States military presence has given America many South Koreans blame the United States for the Kwangju massacre in 1980 (in which South Korean troops under the nominal command of United States Forces Korea killed student protestors); and the Japanese public has often accused its politicians of sacrificing Japan's interests to preserve United States military presence there.

Softening the militarily oriented nature of the United States - Japan bilateral security relationship will help the two countries catch up with developments in the Asian situation. Policy makers in both countries must readily accept Japan's growing role in shaping and preserving the security of Asia. Preserving the security relationship in its current form slows the inevitable process of complete reconciliation and mutual accommodation that Japan must conclude with its neighbors. The United States and Japan should construct a more balanced security relationship that gives greater weight to their shared economic and political interests

circa 1996. Militarily, the United States should continue to facilitate Japan's efforts to become more involved in PKO missions as USFJ has done during the last several years. However, the United States should encourage Japan to rely on other nations to meet these requirements when it is appropriate --- as occurred when JSDF peacekeepers were flown into Zaire by Russian aircraft vice the scheduled United States Air Force C-5.

Japan's efforts at expanded bilateral security dialogues with its neighbors, and nations from other parts of the globe will become more substantial as Washington and Tokyo put less emphasis on their military ties. Similarly, the necessity of improving multilateral security mechanisms will become more pressing if Japan loses much of its protectorate status. Since Japan and many other nations in the region are currently supportive of increased transparency in military capabilities and intentions, and the implementation of effective confidence-building measures, the time is right to construct meaningful multilateral security mechanisms.

This does not preclude the United States and Japan from establishing a bilateral arrangement that can deal with crises in Southeast Asia or other areas of the world. In fact, a looser, more balanced security relationship in which United States ships and aircraft could be given access to Japanese bases in order to support certain contingencies in the South China Sea would be more appropriate in meeting the current threat levels. Under those circumstances the United States would not only be able to use Japanese bases, but it could probably also count on the assistance of a more capable JSDF.

Indeed, even some Chinese security experts, who are opposed to the stationing of United States troops in Japan, acknowledge the utility of United States military presence in

Southeast Asia. Japan as well as many of the ASEAN nations will probably be willing to grant the United States continued access to ports and airfields in order to ensure the security of that sub-region, and its important sea lanes.

The United States does not need to station over 45,000 troops in Japan in order to guarantee that its nuclear umbrella will protect Japan. Even without the presence of United States troops in Japan, a large number of Americans reside in that country. Furthermore, the economic, and social links between the two countries are profound enough to ensure that American interests would be affected by the threat of a nuclear attack on Japan.

If Japan suffered a nuclear attack by a country that could also strike America, United States leaders would be just as willing to retaliate if its troops were not stationed there. If Japan came under a nuclear attack by a country that did not possess the capability to launch such an attack on the United States, American leaders would have a somewhat easier decision to make regarding retaliation. In either case, much of Japan would be destroyed by even limited nuclear attacks on the Kanto and Kansai areas. Furthermore, the likelihood that Japan would be attacked in such a manner by another country is extremely low. The United States nuclear umbrella can not protect Japan from the most likely user of nuclear weapons in today's international security environment --- terrorists.

The architects of the United States - Japan Security Treaty, Dulles and Yoshida, would be surprised by the efforts of policymakers in Tokyo and Washington to continue the security relationship in its present form. At the time, both Japan and the United States entered into the arrangement due to the imperatives of the emerging Cold War. Dulles was

adamant about the need for Japan to provide for as much of its own defense as possible.

Yoshida never intended for Japan to be a permanent protectorate of the United States.

The goals of the Occupation authorities were to rework Japanese society and polity so that Japan could stand on its own again as a power dedicated to peace. They were not interested in establishing a long-term United States commitment to guarantee Japan's external security.

Joseph Nye argues that if there were no United States - Japan security alliance then it would have to be created. [Ref. 149: p. 5] While the United States and Japan certainly might find enough common ground to sign a 1996 security treaty, neither side would currently agree to the basing of over 45,000 United States troops in Japan given the current threat levels. Also a newly created security relationship would undoubtedly be a more balanced agreement that would give Japan more responsibility for its own defense, and the maintenance of regional security.

Both countries require more flexibility in dealing with other Asian countries than their current bilateral relationship allows. In a multipolar world both Japan and the United States must individually decide how to defend their interests as they are challenged. If Japan decides that it prefers to use 'check-book diplomacy' rather than dispatching its troops in a given situation then it should be left to do so --- and to face the good or bad consequences of its decision. Conversely, United States policymakers must remember that they have a duty to choose their fights carefully. Being tied to commitments that do not clearly affect vital interests is a luxury that America can not afford. They also should remember that moral

crusades to remake other countries into America's image do not excuse the immorality of wasting America's sons, daughters, and wealth on fruitless errands.

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APPENDIX A. TERMS FOR JAPANESE SURRENDER

Proclamation approved at Berlin (Potsdam) July 26, 1945

1945 For. Rel. (Conference of Berlin
(Potsdam), II) 1474

PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS, UNITED STATES, CHINA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

(1) We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, *will* mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established *and* until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those industries which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

POTSDAM, July 26, 1945

HARRY S. TRUMAN
WINSTON CHURCHILL
by H. S. T.
PRESIDENT OF CHINA
by wire

APPENDIX B. SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 8, 1951

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore, Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan. The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a Sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

Article I. Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

Article II. During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, power, or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air, or naval forces to any third power.

Article III. The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

Article IV. This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and of Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will

satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

Article V. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this the eighth day of September, 1951.

**APPENDIX C. TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, SIGNED AT WASHINGTON,
D.C., JANUARY 19, 1960**

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I. The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

Article II. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

Article III. The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

Article IV. The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

Article V. Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety

and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI. For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of the United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangement as may be agreed upon.

Article VII. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VIII. This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

Article IX. The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

Article X. This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

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